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Corporate Form and Organizational Behavior 
- Open versus Closed Joint-Stock Companies in Russia - 
Ichiro Iwasaki 
The  vast  majority  of  Russian  corporations,  including  many  manufacturing  and 
communications firms, are still compelled to become closed joint-stock companies that lack a 
modern  democratic  mechanism  in  order  to  attract  capital  from  a  wide  range  of  private 
investors.    This is due to factors such as significant insider ownership, a strong orientation 
among  managers  toward  closed  organizations,  slumping  needs  for  corporate  finance,  and 
underdeveloped  local  financial  institutions.    The  impact  of  ownership  structure  on 
corporate-form choice by Russian firms exists, even if we assume that the two elements are 
determined  endogenously.    Under  these  circumstances,  however,  a  significant  number  of 
closed  companies  attempt  to  develop  more  open internal  organizational  structures that  are 
virtually the same as those in open companies.    Nonetheless, such an institutional coupling of 
a closed corporate form and an open internal organizational structure is far from effective in 
resolving  the  imminent  governance  problems  facing  Russian  corporations,  such  as  the 
prevention of infighting among executives and outside shareholders and the implementation of 
discipline among top management. 
JEL classification numbers: D23, G34, K22, L22, P31 
Keywords: Russia, corporate form, organizational behavior, institutional complementarity 
 
Chapter 2 
Realities of Russian Companies 
- Corporate Control under Concentrated Stock Property - 
Tatiana G. Dolgopyatova 
This  chapter  describes  structures  of  stock  property  in  Russian  companies  with  particular 
attention to capital concentration and its effect on intra-corporate relations including board of   vii 
directors’  composition  and  role.    The  study  is  based  on  the  data  of  a  survey  of  822  top 
managers of large and medium-sizes joint stock companies in industry and communications 
conducted in 2005 at 64 regions of Russia within the joint research project implementing by 
scholars from Hitotsubashi University and State  University - Higher School of Economics. 
High  level  of  concentration  of  equity  capital  is  already  established  in  Russian  joint-stock 
companies.    The prevailing type of corporate control in Russian companies is a control of 
dominating shareholders based on their direct participation in executive management or tight 
supervision of hired managers.    The latter option creates preconditions for gradual separation 
of  ownership  and  management.    Although  inseparability  of  ownership  and  control  still 
prevails, the ongoing business integration works in favour of gradual separation.    Hiring of 
top managers transforms the practice of formation and activities of a board of directors.    It 
evolves into an operative body working in the interests of large shareholders, and it is able to 
monitor  the  executive  management.    Separation  of  management  does  not  affect  capital 
investment, dividend policy, intensity of corporate conflicts and relations with stakeholders.   
Shifts  in  corporate  governance  in the  companies  where  management is  separated  don’t  go 
beyond internal mechanisms, but even this has introduced certain good standards. 
JEL classification numbers: D23, G32, G34, P26, P31 
Keywords: stock ownership, corporate governance, separation of ownership and management 
 
Chapter 3 
Impacts of Corporate Governance and Performance 
on Managerial Turnover in Russian Firms 
Naohito Abe and Ichiro Iwasaki 
In  this  chapter,  we  deliberate  the  possible  impacts  of  corporate  governance  and 
performance on managerial turnover using a unique dataset of Russian corporations.   
This study is different from most previous works in that we deal with not only CEO 
dismissals, but also with managerial turnover in a company as a whole.    We find that 
nonpayment of  dividends  is  correlated  significantly  with managerial turnover.    We 
also find that the presence of dominant shareholders and foreign investors is another 
important factor in causing managerial dismissal  in Russian corporations, but these 
two kinds of company owners reveal different effects in terms of turnover magnitude. 
JEL classification numbers: D21, G34, G35, P31, P34. 
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One  of  the  most  distinguishing  features  of  the  Russian  corporate  sector  is  the 
preponderance of “closed joint-stock companies” over “open joint-stock companies,” 
both  of  which  are  statutory  legal  corporate  forms  defined  in  the  Federal  Law  on 
Joint-Stock Companies (hereinafter, the Law on JSCs).    According to the Supreme 
Arbitration Court, as of July 1, 2001, compared with as many as 370,000 closed JSCs, 
there  were  only  60,000  open  JSCs  in  Russia  (Shapkina,  2002,  p.  5).    Regarding 
large-scale companies that require raising funds from outside sources, the number of 
open JSCs exceeds that of closed JSCs, the latter number still being fairly significant.   
In fact, a survey conducted in 2003 by the Federal State Statistics Service found that, 
of the 32,266 JSCs surveyed, excluding micro and small enterprises, 19,407 were open 
companies,  and  the  remaining  12,859  were  closed  companies  (Rosstat,  2004).    In 
                                                         
*  This  chapter  was  produced  as  a  result  of  a  Japan-Russia  joint  research  project  entitled 
“Corporate Governance and Integration Processes in the Russian Economy” launched by the 
Institute  of  Economic  Research,  Hitotsubashi  University  (Tokyo)  and  the  Institute  for 
Industrial and Market Studies, State University – Higher School of Economics (Moscow).   
The  research  was  financially  supported  by  the  Japan  Securities  Scholarship  Foundation 
(JSSF) and grants-in-aid for scientific research from the Ministry of Education and Science 
of Japan (No. 16530149; No. 17203019) in FY2005 and FY 2006.    I also thank Naohito 
Abe, Tatiana G. Dolgopyatova and Andrei Yakovlev for their valuable comments and Jim 
Treadway for his assistance with English translation.    Needless to say, all remaining errors 
are mine. Chapter 1 
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other  words,  four  in  every  ten  medium-sized  and  large  Russian  corporations  were 
operating under a governance mechanism that put rigorous restrictions on the liquidity 
of their own shares. 
In many developed countries, JSCs are allowed to achieve “virtual” organizational 
closedness by, for instance, making a special resolution in their general shareholders’ 
meeting so as to ban, in principle, the transfer of their shares to third party or adding a 
provision to this effect in their corporation charter.
1    In contrast,  in Russia, closed 
JSCs exist as a legal form of incorporation for business organizations.    Furthermore, 
Russia has an extremely unique legal framework that clearly differentiates between 
closed and open JSCs in terms of the mode of securities issuance, the required levels of 
minimum  capital,  the  restrictions  on  the  number  of  shareholders,  and  disclosure 
obligations. 
Inspired by the economic theory on internal organization that has been developed 
from classical suggestions made by Coase (1937), a large number of empirical studies 
have been conducted with regard to the determinants of organizational choice and the 
relationship  between  organizational  form  and  behavior,  including  corporate 
performance.    The  subjects of these studies are broad, such as the choice between 
outlets  owned  by  franchisees  and  those  owned  by  franchisers  (Brickley  and  Dark, 
1987), the relationship between contract types for international joint venture projects 
and  political  risks  (Phillips-Patrick,  1991),  the  impacts  of  the  spin-off  and 
reorganization of limited companies on corporate value (Denning and Shastri, 1993), 
the organizational advantages of the multidivisional form (M-form) organization over 
                                                         
1  For  example,  in  Japan,  stock  companies  intending  to  make  it  mandatory  for  their 
shareholders to seek their approval for the transfer of their shares must provide a provision 
to that effect in their corporate charter in accordance with Article 107 of the Company Law, 
and companies with such a provision are generally called “closed companies.” There is no 
formal closed JSC as a legal corporate form in continental law countries, either.    On the 
other hand, in the UK, business firms are formally classified according to the Company Law 
into  public  companies  and  private  companies,  depending  on  how  they  raise  funds,  and 
private companies have similar statutory characteristics to those of closed JSCs in Russia. Chapter 1 
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the unitary form (U-form) (Weir, 1996), the relationship between corporate form and a 
growth/survival rate (Harhhoff, Stahl, and Woywode, 1998), the organizational choice 
of insurance distribution systems (Regan and Tzeng, 1999) and that in case of gasoline 
retailing (Blass and Carlton, 2001), the impact of liability systems on the choice of oil 
transportation  system (Brooks, 2002), the organizational choice between closed-end 
and open-end investment funds (Deli and Varma, 2002), the choice of the contract type 
for driver employment in the European trucking industry (Arruñada, González-Díaz, 
and  Fernández,  2004),  and  the  correlation  between  international  disparities  in  the 
business  environment  and  differences  in  the  business  incorporation  rate  among 
countries  (Demirguc-Kunt,  Love,  and  Maksimovic,  2004).    Surprisingly,  though, 
except for a  valuable case study by Karpoff  and Rice (1989), there  has been little 
empirical work investigating organizational choices by JSCs as well as their possible 
impacts  on  corporate  behavior  and  performance.    Thus,  the  corporate  forms  of 
Russian JSCs are a very important research subject to be explored from the viewpoint 
of organizational and financial economics. 
Furthermore,  this  topic  has  great  significance  for  understanding  the  Russian 
economic system, which is now experiencing a large-scale institutional transformation 
towards  a  capitalist  market  economy.    As  long  as  the  primary  nature  of  a  stock 
company can be defined as a modern democratic mechanism for raising funds from the 
general public, an open company, which guarantees free share transferability, is the 
basic form of joint-stock company.    In this sense, a closed JSC is one that distances 
itself  from  the  fundamental  purpose  of  a  modern  corporation.    As  previously 
described, still in Russia, the reality is that not only small corporations but also large 
enterprises are formed as closed JSCs across the country.    It is quite possible that the 
high degree of orientation towards organizational closedness in the Russian business 
sector  is  inseparably  linked  to  its  poor  corporate  governance  practices  and  its 
investment  behavior,  which  remains  inactive  regardless  of  a  significant  economic 
recovery  in  recent  years.    Therefore,  particular  attention  should  also  be  given  to 
research on the corporate forms of Russian firms in the context of the economics of 
transition and the Russian economic studies.    Nevertheless, there have been only a Chapter 1 
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handful of economic studies touching on this topic, including that by Dolgopyatova 
(1995), and virtually no detailed research has been conducted on this aspect. 
An  attempt  is  made  in  this  chapter  to  deal  with  this  significant  but  yet-to-be 
explored  problem  on  the  basis  of  a  large-scale  questionnaire  enterprise  survey 
conducted  from  February  to  June  2005  in  the  framework  of  a  Japan-Russia  joint 
research project launched by Hitotsubashi University and State University – Higher 
School  of  Economics.    In  this  survey,  the  top  management  personnel  of  822 
manufacturing and communications companies located in the 64 federal regions were 
interviewed  in  person.
2    The  companies  covered  by  our  survey  are  all  stock 
companies,  and the  average number of employees per company  is 1,884 (Standard 
deviation: 5,570; Median: 465).    As for their corporate form, open and closed JSCs 
account  for  67.3%  (553  firms)  and  32.7%  (269  firms)  of  the  822  surveyed  firms, 
respectively,  and  this  composition  corresponds  closely  to  the  results  of  the 
aforementioned  corporate  survey  by  the  Russian  statistical  office.
3    Furthermore, 
looking at our surveyed firms by region and by industrial sector, it is confirmed that 
they  provide  an  ideal  sample  group  representing  Russian  medium-sized  and  large 
JSCs.
4 
Relying upon the results of our joint survey, we first examine a variety of factors 
as to why Russian stock companies select to become closed JSCs.    In the latter part of 
this chapter, we deal with the relationship between the corporate forms and internal 
organizational structures, as well as with the impact of these institutional couplings on 
                                                         
2  94.8%  of  those  interviewed  in  our  survey  were  presidents  and  vice-presidents.    The 
remaining respondents were board chairmen (1.6%) and middle-class managers responsible 
for corporate governance matters (3.6%). 
3 The closed JSCs covered by our survey include four workers’ joint-stock companies (people’s 
enterprises), which are a special form of closed company.    Although a workers’ JSC is a 
very interesting legal form to study, it is not investigated in this chapter.    For details of its 
institutional setting, see Iwasaki (2003, pp. 525-527). 
4 For more details of the joint enterprise survey and the main characteristics of the surveyed 
firms, see Dolgopyatova and Iwasaki (2006). Chapter 1 
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organizational  behavior,  including  corporate  performance.    Through  these  research 
steps, we intend to provide new perspectives on the causality between corporate forms 
and organizational behavior. 
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows.    The next section looks at 
the legal framework regulating the corporate forms of the Russian JSCs as well as its 
significance  in  the  context  of  organizational  strategy.    Section  1.3  examines  the 
determinants of organizational choices between open and closed JSCs.    Section 1.4 
focuses  on  the  institutional  complementarity  of  corporate  forms  and  internal 
organizational structures.    Section 1.5 analyzes the relationship between institutional 
equilibrium  of  a  corporate  organization  and  organizational  behavior.    Section  1.6 
concludes the chapter. 
 
1.2. Corporate Forms of Joint-Stock Companies in Russia: Institutional 
Framework and its Significance for Organizational Strategy 
First, in this section, the institutional diversity of open and closed JSCs is discussed, 
and the significance of each of these two corporate forms is then clarified in terms of 
organizational strategies and how the managers interviewed in this survey perceive the 
main factors determining the reasons that their firms chose their current legal form of 
incorporation. 
An investor who intends to establish a stock company in Russia must choose to 
make  it  either  an open  JSC  or  a closed  JSC,  as required  by the provisions of the 
Russian corporate law,
5  which provides for statutory distinctions between these two 
types of corporate forms in the following six areas: (a) share transferability; (b) method 
for issuing securities; (c) required minimum capitalization; (d) number of shareholders; 
(e)  government  funding;  and  (f)  disclosure  obligations  (see  Table  1.1).    First,  a 
                                                         
5 These provisions refer to the Civil Code, Part I, Chapter 4, Articles 96 to 104, and to the Law 
on JSCs.    This section was written taking into account the laws and regulations that were 
effective in Russia during the period of the enterprise survey used as the base material for 
this empirical study. Chapter 1 
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shareholder of an open JSC may freely transfer its shares to any third party other than 
another shareholder of the company or the company itself, while, on the other hand, a 
shareholder of a closed JSC must sell  its shares first to another shareholder of the 
company or the company itself due to the right of preferential purchase given to them.   
Specifically, a shareholder of a closed JSC who intends to transfer its shares to a third 
party  must,  at  its  own  cost,  notify  all  other  shareholders  of  the  company  and  its 
executives  in  writing  concerning  the  selling  price  of  the  shares  by  the  selling 
shareholder, as well as other terms and conditions included in an agreement between 
the selling shareholder and the purchasing third party, in order to confirm whether any 
of the other shareholders of the company or the company itself wishes to execute its 
right  of  preferential  purchase.    This  obligation  enables  a  closed  JSC  and  its 
shareholders to detect in advance every action by any shareholder to transfer its shares 
to a third party and to effectively prevent the stock drain to outside parties by bearing 
necessary costs to purchase these shares.
6 
Secondly, unlike open JSCs, whose shares issued at the time of formation may be 
allocated to their promoters and to the general public (i.e., establishment with outside 
offering), closed JSCs are required to issue their shares only to their promoters and the 
other investors specified in advance.    Even after incorporation, closed JSCs are not 
allowed to offer new shares to the general public, although they may issue corporate 
bonds other than convertible bonds on the securities market as a means of raising funds 
from outside sources. 
Thirdly, the minimum capitalization (share capital) for open JSCs needs to be at 
least 1,000 times the statutory minimum wage at the time of their registration, while, 
                                                         
6 Article 7 of the Regulations for Joint-Stock Companies approved by the Resolution of the 
RSFSR Cabinet of Ministers No. 601 of December 25, 1990, which was later replaced by 
the current Law on JSCs, provided that the shareholders of a closed JSC were prohibited 
from transferring their shares without the approval of a majority of all the shareholders of 
that closed JSC.    It may be said that the share transfer restriction provided in the Law on 
JSCs  now  in  effect  is  rather  less  severe  than  that  in  the  Regulations  for  Joint-Stock 
Companies that was in force until the end of 1995. Chapter 1 
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on the other  hand, closed JSCs  are required to secure only 100 times the statutory 
minimum wage.    For example, the effective statutory minimum wage for the period 
from January to August 2005 was 720 rubles (about USD25) monthly.
7    Therefore, 
there is a difference of 648,000 rubles (about USD23,000) between these two legal 
forms  of  JSCs  established  during  this  period  with  respect  to  their  minimum  share 
capital required by the Law on JSCs, which is not a trivial difference for small and 
venture businesses seeking to be incorporated. 
Fourthly, closed JSCs may not have more than 50 shareholders, and, if the number 
of their shareholders exceeds this limit, they must, within a period of one year, reduce 
it to 50 or less, turn it into an open JSC, or be dissolved.    However, this regulation 
does  not  apply  to  closed  companies  established  by  the  end  of  1995  before  the 
enforcement of the current law on JSCs.    In addition, the August 1996 presidential 
decree,  in  which  closed  JSCs  with  more  than  25%  of  their  shares  owned  by  the 
government were ordered to become open JSCs, was not a very strong legally binding 
instrument since no effective penalties or sanctions were imposed on those violating 
the decree (Iwasaki, 2003, pp. 510-511).
8      As a result, there are still a large number 
of  closed  JSCs  with  50  or  more  shareholders,  and  many  of  them  are  former 
state-owned  enterprises  and  ex-municipal  companies  that  were  privatized  in  the 
process of the mass-privatization policy launched in the early 1990s as well as the 
affiliates of private firms and brand new companies that came into being in those days. 
Fifthly, no state authorities, including local governments, can be the founder of a 
JSC  in  principle.    In  addition,  even  when  a  stock  company  is  exceptionally 
established by a government or state organization using a company separation package 
in which the newly established joint-company inherits the assets of the government or 
state organization, that newly established company must be an open JSC.    However, 
this regulation does not apply to cases in which a stock company is established by a 
                                                         
7 Refer to Article 1 of the amended Federal Law on Minimum Wages of December 29, 2004. 
8 Refers to the Presidential Decree on Measures to Protect the Rights of Shareholders and to 
Ensure the Interests of the State as an Owner and Shareholder of August 18, 1996.    This 
decree lost its effect in February 2005 with the amendment of the Bankruptcy Law. Chapter 1 
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government or state agency as a result of its separation from a privatized firm.    This is 
one of the reasons that there are still many closed JSCs with their shares held by the 
state. 
Lastly, open JSCs are obliged to disclose information,  such as annual business 
reports, financial statements, asset securities reports, and other materials required by 
statute  or  requested  by  the  Federal  Financial  Markets  Service  (FFMS)  and  other 
government authorities, while, on the other hand, closed JSCs are not subject to such 
disclosure requirements, except in cases where they issue bonds and other securities 
using the schemes and prices specified by the financial authorities. 
Meanwhile, as pointed out by Emery, Lewellen, and Mauer (1988) and Gordon 
and  Mackie-Mason  (1994),  tax  distortion  can  have  a  significant  impact  on  the 
decision-making  process  for  investors  and  enterprises  concerning  organizational 
choices.    In Russia, however, there are no differences in the applicable tax provisions 
between open and closed JSCs, and both of these corporate forms are regulated by the 
principle of equal taxation with respect to corporate ownership, investors, and capital 
sources.
9    There  are  no  provisions  set out  in the  Federal  Law  on  Bankruptcy, the 
Corporate Governance Code, or any other legislation that could seriously affect the 
choice of the corporate form by a JSC. 
The  results  of  the  joint  enterprise  survey,  in  which  corporate  executives  were 
asked  how  they  perceived the significance of the aforesaid  legal  framework  in the 
context of their organizational strategies, as well as the most important reason for them 
to  keep  their  company  in  the  current  corporate  form,  revealed  that  many  of  the 
respondents  recognized  that  the  choice  between  an  open  and  a  closed  JSC  had  a 
considerable  impact  on  its  corporate  strategies.    Of  793  firms  that  provided  valid 
responses to the survey, 602 (75.9%) replied that their corporate-form choice would or 
might affect their business growth, far more than the 191 (24.1%) that answered that 
                                                         
9 Refer to Article 3 of Part I of the Tax Code.    Although it is not reported in Article 3, it is 
widely recognized that the principle of equal taxation is construed to be applied to both open 
and closed JSCs (Abrosimov et al., 2005, p. 10).    In fact, in Russia, joint-stock companies 
are treated equally to limited companies and other types in terms of taxation. Chapter 1 
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difference between the two company groups in the breakdown of their answers to the 
above question. 
Table 1.3 indicates the answers of our respondents to the question of what was the 
most  important  reason  for  their  companies  having  the  current  corporate  form.   
Compared with 11.8%, who identified it as related to legal restrictions concerning the 
number of shareholders and the minimum required capital, 75.5% replied that it was 
because  of  the  mass-privatization  policy  in  the  early  1990s  or  because  of  a 
management decision made on their own or by their shareholders.    The result that 
54.4%  of  the  open  JSCs  answered  they  had  become  open  JSCs  due  to  the 
mass-privatization  policy  is  quite  understandable  in  the  historical  context  that  the 
Federal  Government  had  strongly  urged  soon-to-be-privatized  enterprises  to  select 
becoming open JSCs by facilitating a swap between privatization vouchers distributed 
to  the  general  public  free  of  charge  and  the  shares  of  state-owned  and  municipal 
enterprises.    On the other hand, in consideration of the fact that managers and worker 
collectives are still the dominant shareholders in many Russian firms and in light of the 
introverted mentality of these insider shareholders, it also makes sense that they favor 
a closed company as a result of their decision-making on their organizational strategy 
under the given uncertain social environment typical of a transition period. 
 
1.3. The Choice of Corporate Form by Russian Firms 
In Russia, the  growing trend toward a market economy and  its  integration into the 
global economy are forcing domestic firms to tackle the issue of optimal adaptation to 
ever-changing  business  environments.    Hence,  it  is  not  uncommon  for  Russian 
corporations to make a major change in their company profile, including their form of 
incorporation.
10    For instance, companies much more frequently change from limited 
                                                         
10  In  fact,  experts  at  the  Levada  Center  Social  Research  Institution  (the  former  USSR 
All-Soviet Public Opinion Poll Center) who assisted with our enterprise survey, basing their 
opinion on their own experience, predicted that only about 200 of 500 firms would retain 
their company profile almost unchanged for a period of 5 years after being surveyed. Chapter 1 
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to joint-stock stature and vice versa than they do in Western countries.    Needless to 
say, changes from an open JSC to a closed JSC and the reverse, which can only take 
place  by  amending  a  company  charter  through  a  special  resolution  at  a  general 
shareholders’ meeting and then officially registering such an amendment, take place all 
the time (Tikhomirov, 2001, p. 91). 
Although the law on JSCs stipulates that the amendment of a company charter 
must be made through a special resolution, which is passed by a majority of at least 
three-fourths of the votes cast by the shareholders with voting shares in attendance, 
this provision is not a serious obstacle to such amendments because, in many Russian 
companies, a small number of shareholders own a significant share of the total; that is, 
for the top management and major shareholders of Russian stock companies, the issue 
of whether their firms should be open or closed JSCs is just an “operational” variable 
even after their establishment. 
The discussion in the previous section highlights the difference between open and 
closed JSCs as a corporate form option available in Russia and the significance of 
these two corporate forms from the viewpoint of organizational strategies as well as 
the impact of the mass-privatization policy on the decision-making process of stock 
companies about whether they should be open or closed JSCs.    Based on these facts 
uncovered by our enterprise survey, this section is a theoretical and empirical analysis 
of the organizational choice mechanism of Russian corporations. 
1.3.1. Theoretical Considerations 
According  to  the  economic  theory  of  the  organization  and the firm  advocated  and 
developed by Alchian and Demsetz (1972), Jensen and Meckling (1976), Mayers and 
Smith (1981), Fama and Jensen (1983a, b), Williamson (1985; 1996), Milgrom and 
Roberts  (1992),  Jensen  (2000),  Furubotn  and  Richter  (2005),  and  others,  the 
differences in the institutional setting between an open and closed JSC would affect the 
incentives  and  decision-making  process  of  corporate  managers  and  shareholders 
through the following three mechanisms, which have a significant influence on their 
choices of corporate form. Chapter 1 
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The first mechanism is the asset effect of restrictions on share transfer; that is, any 
restrictions imposed on a closed company on the transfer of its shares will undermine 
the  liquidity  and  value  of  such  shares  as  financial  commodities.    Furthermore,  as 
explained in Section 1.2, a shareholder of a closed JSC intending to transfer its shares 
to  a  third  party  must  bear  all  the  costs  needed  to  confirm  if  any  of  the  other 
shareholders in the closed JSC or the company itself wishes to execute its right of 
preferential purchase.    Therefore, those who invest money purely to gain a return on 
their investment (i.e., portfolio investors) will buy the shares of open JSCs, rather than 
those of closed JSCs, ceteris paribus.    Based on the same logic, corporate executives 
would prefer to have the corporate form of an open company from the viewpoint of 
issuing securities to raise funds from outside sources, since a closed company must pay 
for all the marginal capital costs equal to the transaction costs for the transfer of its 
own shares to a third party and the cost of a low liquidity premium on its own shares 
and closed JSCs are placed at a disadvantage over open JSCs due to the ban on issuing 
any  convertible  bonds.    In  addition,  as  indicated  in  Table  1.2,  a  firm’s  choice  of 
adopting the open company as its corporate form will increase the transparency of its 
management,  making  it  easier  for  the  firm  to  receive  loans  from  banks  and  other 
financial institutions.    Considering the above, the higher a firm’s fundraising demand, 
the more likely it is to be an open JSC. 
The  second  mechanism  is  the  governance  effect  of  share  transfer  restrictions.   
Strict restrictions imposed on a closed JSC on the transfer of its shares significantly 
decrease the possibility of a change in its internal control or ownership that may be 
made due to an “exit” from the company of its shares sold, tender offer, proxy fight, 
and bankruptcy, posing a serious impediment to the reshuffling of a management body 
that  has  failed  to  come  up  with  effective  corporate  discipline  and  to  achieve  the 
expected performance.    Therefore, from the standpoint of which corporate form has a 
relatively  better  corporate  governance  mechanism,  outside  shareholders  are  more 
inclined to invest in open JSCs, while, on the other hand, corporate managers who 
wish to retain their managerial discretion to behave in an opportunistic way or wish to 
avoid the risk of outsiders attempting a hostile takeover bid choose to establish and Chapter 1 
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keep their firms as closed stock companies. 
The third mechanism suggested  in organizational economics  is the  information 
effect of state disclosure regulation.    The disclosure obligation imposed only on open 
JSCs by the state produces the effect of alleviating the information asymmetry between 
executives and investors in favor of the latter, causing more outside shareholders to 
invest in open JSCs, which have a better governance system than closed JSCs, and 
more managers to operate their firms as closed companies. 
In addition to the above three mechanisms, focus also needs to be given to the 
widespread existence of business groups (i.e., financial-industrial groups or holding 
companies)  as  a  factor  having  a  significant  impact  on  the  organizational  choices 
between open and closed JSCs in Russia.
11    In fact, our survey revealed that 35.7% of 
the manufacturing companies (268 of 751 firms) and 77.5% of the communications 
companies  (55  of  71  firms)  were  controlled  by  certain  business  groups  through 
shareholding.    Hence,  the  following  hypothesis  may  be  proposed:  as  the  fourth 
mechanism, a company’s participation in a business group is effective in protecting it 
from  outside threats, such as  state intervention or hostile  takeover  bits,  due  to  the 
political  influence  exerted  by  the  business  group  the  company  belongs  to  and  the 
cross-shareholding  relationship  within  member  firms.
12     As  a  result,  the 
organizational advantages of a closed JSC as an “institutional defense barrier” become 
trivial for group companies.    Furthermore, it is not desirable for business groups to 
place restrictions that are too strict on the transfer of their shares from the viewpoint of 
                                                         
11 See  Johnson  (1997), Perotti  and Gelfer  (2001),  Hoffman  (2002),  Klepach  and  Yakovlev 
(2004), and Guriev and Rachinsky (2005) for details on the financial-industrial groups and 
oligarchs in Russia. 
12 In fact, according to our survey results, one in five managers of the group firms regards 
effective protection from hostile acquisition as the greatest advantage of being members of 
holding companies or other business groups, and this factor accounts for 13.3% in the all 
multiple answers (two items at a maximum) following “stronger position in the domestic 
market”  (32.2%)  and  “better  access  to  invested  funds  and  easier  introduction  of  new 
technologies” (31.0%). Chapter 1 
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ensuring effective inter-group asset management.    Therefore, the growing trend for 
Russian companies to take part in a financial-industrial group or a holding company is 
expected to increase the possibility of member firms being operated as  open JSCs.   
However, with the hierarchy within such business groups expanding, enterprises in the 
lower  echelons  are  more  likely  to  be  established  by  their  upper  companies  as  the 
wholly  owned  subsidiaries  or  dummy  firms  for  account-rigging  or  tax  evasion 
purposes,  and  these  enterprises  are  usually  closed  companies  bound  by  less  strict 
disclosure obligations.    Consequently, the organizational scale of a business group is 
thought to be positively correlated with the proportion of closed JSCs in the member 
firms of that group. 
Lastly, as explained above, considering the background of Russia’s privatization 
policy  and  its  legal  restrictions  on  state  investment,  privatized  companies  and 
companies  separated  from  state-owned  or  municipal  companies  are  more  likely  to 
choose to operate as open JSCs compared to enterprises newly established by private 
capital after the fall of the communist regime; that is, the impact of past policies on 
company  start-ups  may  have  a  historical  path-dependent  effect  on  organizational 
choices.    In summary, Russian stock companies branch away either to open JSCs or to 
closed JSCs through the interaction of the aforementioned five mechanisms. 
1.3.2. Empirical Assessment 
In  this  subsection,  we  empirically  test  the  theoretical  mechanism  of  making  a 
corporate-form choice  as  well as  its impact  and statistical significance of choosing 
each alternative.    We estimate our organizational choice models by probit methods 
using a discrete variable, in which closed JSCs take a value of 1 (versus 0), as the 
dependent  variable  (CLOCOM)  as  well  as  adapting  the  following  independent 
variables: (a) ownership variables representing the influence of outside shareholders 
and managers over organizational strategies, (b) variables concerning the constraints 
affecting  capital  demand  and  supply  of  the  company;  (c)  variables  regarding  the 
linkage between a company with a business group and the organizational scale of that 
group; (d) variables concerning the impact of past policies on company start-ups; and Chapter 1 
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The variables used as proxies of company’s capital demand are a securities-issuing 
planning dummy (SECPLA) in which, if the company has a plan to issue securities in 
Russia in the near future, it takes a value of 1, if the company has a plan to issue shares 
and bonds in foreign financial markets, where more stringent rules than in Russia are 
enforced with respect to organizational management and disclosure, it takes a value of 
2,  and,  if  neither  of  these  two  conditions  applies,  it  takes  a  value  of  0,  and  a 
relationship-banking  dummy  (RELBAN)  for  companies  with  a  long-term  credit 
relationship  with  a  certain  commercial  bank.    On  the  other  hand,  as  a  proxy  for 
representing  the  constraints  affecting  the  capital  procurement  of  a  company,  the 
number  of  financial  institutions  per  1,000  non-financial  corporations  in  a  federal 
district where the company  is located (NUMFIN) is  introduced.    NUMFIN is used 
because, except in a few big cities, local commercial banks and investment firms play a 
critical role in the field of investment financing and financial consulting services for 
the corporate sector, and the development of these  local financial  institutions  is an 
overriding factor affecting the fundraising abilities of local companies. 
The variables for the relationship between a company and a business group the 
company belongs to are a group firm dummy (GROFIR) that takes a value of 1 if the 
company is a member of a certain holding company or other business group by owning 
stocks, as well as a core corporation dummy (GROCOR) and an affiliate firm dummy 
(GROAFF),  both  of  which  reflect  the  characteristics  of  the  company’s  group 
membership.    The  organizational  size  of  the  business  group  is  represented  by  the 
natural logarithm of the total number of its member firms (GROSIZ). 
The impact of past policies on company start-ups is assessed using two dummy 
variables from the standpoint of the importance of the mass-privatization policy and 
the statutory regulations on investments by state agencies.    Namely, PRICOM takes a 
value of 1, if the company is a privatized firm of a former state-owned or ex-municipal 
enterprise.    SPIOFF  captures  firms  that  span  off  from  state-owned  enterprises  or Chapter 1 
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privatized companies.
14    The control  variables include the  natural logarithm of the 
total number of employees representing the company size (COMSIZ) and a series of 
industrial dummy variables to control industrial effects. 
In accordance with our theoretical considerations in Subsection 1.3.1, we expect 
that  the  ownership  by  outside  shareholders  represented  in  OWNOUT  and  other 
variables  restrains  companies  from  being  closed  JSCs;  in  other  words,  outsider 
ownership  is  negatively  correlated  with  the  choice  of  a  closed  JSC.    The  sign  of 
MANSHA cannot be specified at this stage, as it varies depending on which element is 
more powerful, the marginal assessment value of own shares by a manager or a group 
of  managers,  or  the  additional  benefits  the  manager  obtains  by  operating  a  closed 
company.    All  of  the  three  variables  concerning  capital  demand  and  supply  are 
expected  to  be  negative.    The  three  dummy  variables  representing  a  company’s 
participation in a business group would be negatively correlated with the company’s 
choice of the corporate form of a closed JSC, whereas GROSIZ would have a positive 
sign.    PRICOM and SPIOFF, both of which reflect the  impact of past policies on 
company start-ups, would be negative.    COMSIZ are also expected to be negative; 
this is because the larger the size of a company is, the more shareholders and the more 
capital the company has, and the requirements to choose the corporate form of an open 
JSC are gradually fulfilled. 
Table 1.4 compares open and closed JSCs using the above independent variables.   
Open JSCs, regardless of their type, have a higher average outside ownership than 
closed JSCs, and the difference between the two forms of incorporation in this regard 
is  significant  at  the  1%  level,  except  for  foreign  ownership.    In  contrast,  the 
percentage of companies with large management shareholders in all samples of closed 
JSCs  is  15%  higher  than  that  of  open  JSCs,  and  the  difference  between  them  is 
statistically significant at the 1% level.    Furthermore, the differences between open 
and closed JSCs in the proportion of companies having a long-term credit relationship 
                                                         
14 Hence, newly established private firms after the collapse of the Soviet Union are treated as 
the reference in our estimation. Chapter 1 
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with a certain commercial bank, the proportion of privatized firms, and the average 
number  of  employees  are  also  statistically  significant  and  consistent  with  our 
theoretical  hypotheses.    The  remaining  variables  need  to  be  reexamined  using  a 
regression analysis technique, since their statistical significance was not detected by 
simply comparing the descriptive statistics. 
The basic sample for our estimation consists of 557 observations, excluding all 
stock companies that have already issued securities in the past (Sample I).    In order to 
validate  the  robustness  of  the  estimation  results,  a  supplementary  estimation  is 
performed using the following three cases: Sample II, which is made up of the firms 
included in Sample I excluding all communications firms; Sample III, which excludes 
firms whose number of employees exceeds the mean of the number of employees of 
the closed JSCs plus/minus 1 standard deviation from the basic sample set; and Sample 
IV,  which  consists  of firms with  a  stable  ownership  structure  that  did not see  any 
changes in major shareholders from 2001 to 2004.    An estimation using the former 
two  cases  focuses  on the  estimation  bias  arising  from  the  characteristics  of  newly 
emerged telecommunication businesses and those of mega corporations.    On the other 
hand, the estimation using sample IV deals with the possible endogeneity relating to 
corporate forms and ownership structures.    Furthermore, as an alternative way to cope 
with  the  endogeneity  problem,  we  also  conduct  a  two-stage  estimation
15   by 
introducing  the  following  four  variables  as  instruments:  a  dummy  variable  of 
shareholding  by  an  incumbent  CEO  (or  president)  (CEOSHA),  a  dummy  variable 
which  takes  a  value  of  1  if  there  is  a  shareholder  or  a  shareholder  group  who 
substantially controls corporate management (DOMSHA), the age level of the CEO or 
company president (CEOAGE), and a three-point-scale assessment on the intensity of 
                                                         
15 The two-stage procedure would be to estimate the reduced forms for ownership variables by 
probit or ordered probit maximum likelihood and estimate the corporate-form choice model 
by probit after substituting predicted values for ownership variables.    For more details of 
the  two-stage  estimation  methods,  see  Maddala  (1983),  Newey  (1987),  and  Rivers  and 
Vuong (1988). Chapter 1 
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competition  with  domestic  firms  in  a  product  market  (COMDOM).
16 The  White 
estimator of heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors is used for various statistical 
tests. 
The  following  is  the  basic  equation  for  our  regression,  and  the  marks  in 
parentheses stand for the expected signs: 
Pr[CLOCOM=1]  =  F(constant,  OUTOWN(-),  MANSHA(?),  SECPLA(-), 
RELBAN(-), NUMFIN(-), GROFIR(-), GROSIZ(+), PRICOM(-), SPIOFF(-), 
COMSIZ(-), industrial dummies) 
Table  1.5  shows  the  estimation  results.
17    The  coefficients of  the  independent 
variables represent their marginal effects.    The marginal effect in the probit model is 
computed as: 









Except for the variables representing ownership by financial institutions including 
commercial banks and foreign ownership, all of the explanatory variables for Model 
(A) through Model (D) estimated using the basic sample have the predicted signs with 
                                                         
16  The  correlation  coefficients  for CLOCOM and each  of the  newly introduced 4  variables 
range between -0.032 and 0.019, and are statistically insignificant. 
17 The correlation coefficients for the independent variables used in each model are well below 
a threshold of 0.70 for possible multicollinearity in all combinations (Lind et al., 2004). 
18 The marginal effect for a binary independent variable (say D) would be Pr[CLOCOM=1| ) (D x , 
D=1] - Pr[CLOCOM=1| ) (D x , D=0], where ) (D x denotes the means of all the other variables 
in the model (Greene, 2003, pp. 667-668). Chapter 1 
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high statistical significance.
19    The presence of outside shareholders diminishes the 
probability  that  an  investment-target  firm  will  become  a  closed  JSC.    Another 
interesting aspect is that the marginal effect of state involvement is much stronger than 
the influence of private owners.    The impact of capital demand and the development 
of local financial institutions also reduce the probability of the emergence of closed 
JSCs.    Companies linked with a business group through ownership tend to choose to 
become open JSCs.    However, the larger a business group becomes, the higher the 
number of closed companies that are included among its member firms.    Privatized 
firms, as well as JSCs span off from state-owned or municipal  enterprises or from 
privatized companies, are more likely to be open companies.    In addition, as the size 
of  a  company  grows,  the  likelihood  of  the  company  operating  as  a  closed  JSC 
significantly decreases. 
On  the  other  hand,  the  result  that  a  large  management  shareholder  dummy 
(MANSHA)  is  significant  and  positive  gives  a  special  characteristic  to the  Russian 
economy.    This  implies  that  Russian  managers  place  far  more  importance  on 
maintaining  effective  control  of  their  company  than  on  obtaining  capital  gains  by 
having stock in their companies.    In other words, they have a strong desire to prevent 
outsiders  from  participating  in  their  management  activities  even  at  the  cost  of  a 
somewhat  reduced  value  and  lowered  transferability  of  their  own  shares.
20   
Furthermore,  this  result  clearly  demonstrates  that  the  most  attractive  reason  for 
Russian managers to operate their firms as closed JSCs is the variety of fringe benefits 
                                                         
19  The  non-significance  of  ownership  by  financial  institutions  and  foreign  ownership  is 
consistent with the statements pointed out by many  researchers pertaining to the passive 
attitude  of  commercial  banks  and  investment  funds  as  institutional  investors,  the  weak 
presence of foreign shareholders, and the widespread share purchases by managers and their 
affiliates through offshore companies (Iwasaki, 2006). 
20 This is closely associated with the fact that the sample firms for the empirical analysis in this 
section as well as the massive majority of Russian companies are unlisted with stock prices 
that are not particularly sensitive to management performance, which leads to an extremely 
low incentive effect of stock ownership by managers. Chapter 1 
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they  obtain  by  doing  so.    Although  14  years  have  passed  since  the  systemic 
transformation  to  a  market  economy,  it  is  highly  probable  that  many  corporate 
executives  still  hold  on to  such  perceptions  under  the  conditions  of  the  developed 
capital and managerial markets in the Russian economy. 
It is logical that SECPLA for Model (E) and that for Model (F) are a little less 
significant than those for the other models, since the sample set does not include any 
communications companies,
21  which represent the emerging industry in Russia, and 
largest corporations that have substantial financial needs and are highly motivated to 
raise equity capital.    It is not surprising that the GROFIR and GROSIZ for Model (G) 
are insignificant, considering that an impressive 46.4% of the surveyed firms (110 of 
237) that experience a substantial change in their ownership structure from 2001 to 
2004 concentrate on group firms.    What is more important, from the viewpoint of the 
statistical  robustness  of  the  estimation  results,  is  that  the  explanatory  power  and 
significance of the ownership variables in Model (G) are almost the same level as those 
of the estimates for Model (A).
22    In addition, the result of two-stage probit estimation 
of Model (H) also strongly suggests that there is an empirical relation between the 
corporate form and the ownership structure even if we assume that both of them are 
determined endogenously. 
Thus, our estimation results strongly support the theoretical hypothesis stated in 
Subsection  1.3.1;  that  is,  the  five  organizational  choice-mechanisms,  including  the 
asset  effect  and  governance  effect  arising  from  share  transfer  restrictions,  are 
effectively  functioning  in the real world.      In  other  words,  there  are  four primary 
influential  factors:  (a)  a  concentrated  insider  ownership  structure,  (b)  persistent 
                                                         
21 In fact, the Russian communication sector, which has been developing in recent years at a 
breathtaking speed, driven by cellular phone and Internet service businesses, saw an average 
annual real growth rate of 22.4% between 2001 and 2004, much higher than the 4.2% for the 
eight  manufacturing  sectors  covered  by  our  enterprise  survey;  that  is  why  the 
telecommunication sector is regarded as the new economy in Russia. 
22  On the other hand, all models were re-estimated by logit and the results were found to be 
almost the same as those indicated in Table 1.5. Chapter 1 
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orientation towards organizational closedness among corporate officers, (c) sluggish 
capital demand in the corporate sector, and (d) an underdeveloped regional financial 
sector,  all  of  which  cause  many  JSCs  to  choose  the  corporate  form  of  a  closed 
company in Russia.    The impact of ownership structure on corporate-form choice by 
Russian  firms  exists,  even  if  we  assume  that  the  two  elements  are  determined 
endogenously. 
 
1.4. Institutional Complementarity between the Corporate Form and the 
Internal Organizational Structure 
Choosing which corporate form to take has an important strategic meaning for a JSC 
with regard to defining its organizational openness and balancing the power between 
its  managers  and  shareholders;  however,  this  is  not  the  only  step  required.    Its 
objective  is  fulfilled  when  the  company  has  finalized  its  internal  organizational 
structure by, for example, drawing up a corporate charter and electing the corporate 
bodies  required  by  law.    This  section  further  examines  corporate  form  issues  by 
focusing  on  the  institutional  complementarity  between  the  corporate  form  and  the 
internal organizational structure. 
1.4.1. A New Approach to Institutional Complementarity: Function-Enhancing 
Complementarity versus Function-Neutralizing Complementarity 
A general perception by economists of the concept of institutional complementarity is 
represented in the following statements by Aoki (2000, pp. 57-58): 
‘If the institutional structure of a particular economy reflects equilibrium strategies 
in its underlying evolutionary game, complementarity is likely to exist between the 
elements  of  that  structure.  That  is,  the  operations  of  one  institution  will  be 
reinforced by the existence of other institutions. This is referred to as “institutional 
complementarity,”…’ (Emphasis added). 
The concept of institutional complementarity not only refers to the institutional 
compatibility in a particular economic system but also implies a positive assessment of Chapter 1 
  24 
referred to as a “function-neutralizing complementary equilibrium.” 
A  function-neutralizing  complementary  equilibrium  tends  to  be  achieved  when 
institution  ȍ
+  is  exogenous  to  a  given  economic  entity  or  when  it  is  still  under 
development in its evolutional process.    If institution ȍ
+ transforms into ȍ
++ with the 
desired  functional  level  by  becoming  endogenous  to  a  given  economic  entity  or 
gaining perfection over time, it is presumed that there is also a change in institution Ȍ
-, 
leading  to  the  emergence  of  a  new,  non-function-neutralizing  complementary 
equilibrium expressed as (ȍ
++, Ȍ
++).    In this sense, an institutional arrangement with 
function-neutralizing  complementary  characteristics  generates  only  a  short-term 
equilibrium.    As  seen  in  the  relationship  between  law  and  business,  however,  the 
wider the social hierarchy is between a particular economic entity (enterprise) and an 
institutional builder (legislative body) for institution ȍ
+, the more difficult it is for the 
former  to  achieve  a  long-term  equilibrium.  Therefore,  a  function-neutralizing 
complementary  equilibrium  exists  for  a  substantial  period  of  time  in  the  real 
incomplete world, even though  it is theoretically transient.    With this in mind, the 
impact  of  a  function-neutralizing  complementary  equilibrium  on  the  economic 
performance under assessment cannot be disregarded. 
As  is  probably  quite  evident,  this  chapter  provides  a  good  opportunity  for  an 
empirical  study  of  the  two  examples  of  institutional  complementarity,  making  it 
possible to observe both the function-enhancing and function-neutralizing aspects of 
institutional complementarity by looking at various combinations of corporate forms 
and  internal  organizational  structures.    The  dichotomous  options  of  statutory 
corporate form enforced by the Russian corporate law, i.e., the choice between an open 
and  a closed company, are probably  not  satisfactory to  the  JSCs whose ownership 
structures and business environments are diverse.    This is because the ideal degree of 
organizational  openness  and  desirable  power  balance  between  managers  and 
shareholders  differ  from  company  to  company.    In  addition,  after  an  enterprise 
determines its corporate form in accordance with the organizational choice mechanism 
verified in the previous section, the enterprise has to address the issue of reconciling 
the interests of stakeholders. Chapter 1 
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For example, some of those who invested in a closed JSC may have the persistent 
complaint that the restrictions on share transferability imposed by the  law on JSCs 
unreasonably increase the company’s organizational closedness, whereas some open 
JSC managers may continue to feel cautious about the statutory rights of shareholders 
to freely transfer shares, as well as about the disclosure requirements, due to a possible 
risk of the company being excessively exposed to the outside environment.    Of course, 
there also may be shareholders and managers who regard the institutional effect of the 
corporate  form  they  have  chosen  as  insufficient.    These  people  try  to  affect  the 
functional strength of their companies’ corporate forms and to further achieve more 
adequate  organizational  openness  and  power  balance  by  amending  their  corporate 
charters to include their original provisions on share transfers and by exercising their 
influence over the decision-making process to determine the number of members and 
the composition and rules of internal corporate organs. 
In the case described above, open (closed) JSCs are regarded to have attained a 
function-enhancing  complementary  arrangement  by  coordinating  the  organizational 
openness (closedness) of their internal structures.    Conversely, enterprises that chose 
an open (closed) JSC as their corporate form and adjusted their internal structures to 
have closed (open) characteristics are judged to have selected a function-neutralizing 
complementary equilibrium as their institutional arrangement.    By applying the above 
criteria  to our  firm-level data,  the  next subsection describes  the  actual  behavior  of 
Russian corporations in this respect. 
1.4.2. Institutional Arrangement of the Corporate Form and Internal Structure 
in Russian Firms 
The internal structure of a stock company is quite complex.    Hence, the following 
analysis of our survey results was carried out in order to measure the organizational 
openness  of  the  internal  structure  as  a  whole  of  each  surveyed  firm:    Hayashi’s 
quantification  method  III
24  was  used  for  24  qualitative  variables  (categorical  data) 
                                                         
24  The  quantification  method  III  uses  structural  description  models,  as  do  the  principal 
component analysis method and the factor analysis method.    However, it analyzes not the Chapter 1 
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collected from 553 firms, which represent the characteristics of a statutory corporate 
structure  in  terms  of  the  content  of  a  corporate  charter  regarding  shareholders’ 
ownership and their voting rights, general shareholders’ meetings, board of directors, 
collective  executive  organs,
25  audit  committees  (auditors),  and  external  auditors,  in 
order  to  obtain  sample  scores  of  the  second  eigenvalues  that  best  represent  the 
organizational openness of a company’s internal structure. 
Table  1.6  lists  the  variables  used  in  the  analysis.    These  variables  contain 
information about the existence of corporate charter provisions that limit the number of 
shares  owned  per  shareholder  or  restrict  shareholder  voting  rights  as  well  as  the 
composition  of  its  membership,  frequency  of  meetings,  and  authority  of  corporate 
organizations over management decisions.    In this table, the response rate of these 
variables  for  each  corporate  form  is  also  shown.    The  Ȥ
2  test  of  differences  of 
proportions revealed that the difference between open and closed JSCs was statistically 
significant for 16 of the 24 categories.    As expected, these figures clearly suggest that 
closed  JSCs  generally  have  a  more  closed  internal  structure  than  open  stock 
companies. 
The sample scores calculated on the basis of the categorical quantity of the second 
eigenvalue listed at the far right of Table 1.6 are hereinafter referred to as openness 
scores (OPESCO), which are used as indices to quantify the openness of the internal 
organizational  structure.    OPESCO  ranges  from  -2.910  to  2.020,  and  its  mean 
                                                                                                                                                                        
continuous (quantitative) variable, but the categorical data expressed as {0, 1}. 
25  A collective executive organ headed by the company president (the general director), which 
is an internal executive organization voluntarily set up by a company, “takes leadership in 
daily  corporate management  except  for  exclusive competence  of the  general shareholder 
meeting and the board of directors” (Article 69(2) of the law on JSCs).    In addition, Article 
66(2) of that law prohibits members of a collective executive organ from making up more 
than one-quarter of the board of directors.    With these provisions in view, it is assumed that 
the presence of a collective executive organ functions to clarify management responsibilities 
and to enhance the independence of the board of directors from management (Iwasaki, 2003, 
pp. 511-514). Chapter 1 
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(median) is -0.093 (-0.052).    The mean (median) OPESCO for open JSCs is 0.045 
(0.023), and that for closed JSCs is -0.472 (-0.510), and the difference of the means 
between these two company groups is significant at the 1% level (t=5.178, p=0.000).   
Hence,  there  is  a  substantial,  statistically  significant  difference  between  open  and 
closed companies in terms of the openness of their internal structures. 
The  determinants  of  the  openness  of  an  internal  structure  of  a  company  may 
overlap with the factors affecting its choice of corporate form discussed in Subsection 
1.3.2.    In particular, the authority exerted by outside shareholders and executives over 
corporate management, as well as the company’s membership in a business group, are 
expected to have a significant impact, since the mode of the internal organizational 
structure is directly related to how the company divides its managerial control.    In 
addition, as we mentioned in Section 1.2, it is presumed that the formation of an open 
internal structure enables the company to demonstrate a more transparent management 
style for business partners and potential investors and to be more actively involved in 
raising  capital  than  those  with  a  closed  internal  structure.    In  order  to  verify  this 
presumption,  we  conduct  an  OLS  estimation  to  regress  OPESCO  on  the  variables 
representing ownership by outside shareholders and managers, the proxy variables of 
capital demand and supply constraints, and a group company dummy, while controlling 
the  impact  of  past  policies  on  company  start-ups  and  the  size  and  sector  of  the 
company.
26    Table 1.7 shows the results.
27    It indicates: (a) that ownership by outside 
shareholders and corporate managers adversely affects the formation of a company’s 
internal structure; (b) that the membership in a business group accelerates the openness 
of the internal structure in its member firms against the theoretical background that a 
firm can reduce the risk of being exposed to external threats by becoming a  group 
company, and that the holding company and core group companies try to establish 
                                                         
26  The basic sample for the OLS estimation consists of 417 observations.    Sample constraints 
are provided in accordance with the corporate-form choice models. 
27  As in the case of Note 17, all correlation coefficients between the independent variables 
used in these models are smaller than a threshold of 0.7, and the variance inflation factor for 
each of the independent variables is well under a threshold of 10.0 (mean = 2.347). Chapter 1 
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effective governance mechanisms in affiliated companies for a corrective purpose; and 
(c) that the significantly estimated RELBAN has a positive sign corresponding to the 
theoretical assumption of constraints on  capital supply and demand.    These results 
imply that there are many common factors that have the same direction of impact both 
on the choice of corporate form and the formation of the internal structure.    These 
elements appear as driving forces to promote the coevolution and function-enhancing 
institutional arrangements of a company’s legal form of incorporation and its internal 
organizational structure. 
Meanwhile, the following interesting fact was found by looking at OPESCO from 
a different angle.    As referred to in Section 1.2, the respondents were asked whether 
or not they believed the corporate form of their company was beneficial to the growth 
of the business.    When comparing the OPESCO values for companies that answered 
“beneficial”  with  those  of  the  companies  that  answered  “detrimental,”  the  sample 
group of open JSCs  had  an  average  ratio  of  0.03 (265 firms)  to  -0.09  (43  firms), 
whereas that for the sample group of closed JSCs was -0.61 (97 firms) to -0.09 (14 
firms), suggesting that JSCs, the managers of which have a negative view of their own 
corporate form, are inclined to develop an internal structure with function-neutralizing 
characteristics.    In particular, the difference between closed JSCs with a positive view 
and  closed  JSCs  with  a  negative  view  is  statistically  quite  significant  (t=2.216, 
p=0.029).
28    That  is,  closed  companies  that  are  not  satisfied  with  their  closed 
disposition  in  term  of  the  corporate  form  are  much  more  likely  to  achieve 
function-neutralizing complementary institutional arrangements than open companies.   
This implies the possibility that dissatisfaction with the corporate form of a closed JSC 
comes from its organizational closed nature represented by severe restrictions on share 
transferability imposed by the Russian corporate law. 
As is clear from the above examination, the distribution of OPESCO for open and 
closed JSCs is diverse, and there is a general tendency for open companies to try to 
make their internal structures more open to the outside world and for closed companies 
                                                         
28  The result of the same test for open companies is as follows: t=0.751, p=0.453. Chapter 1 
  29 
to act in the reverse.    Hence, looking at the overall picture of the current  state of 
Russian  JSCs,  their  dynamic  and  systematic  efforts  to  attain  a  function-enhancing 
complementary equilibrium for their internal structures are noticeable.    However, as 
indicated by the frequency distribution charts in Figure 1.1, there are many open JSCs 
that have internal structures with openness levels that are the same or lower than the 
average of internal structures in closed JSCs.    At the same time, there is a significant 
number of closed JSCs with open internal structures.    In fact, when categorizing our 
surveyed firms into a company with an open internal structure and a company with a 
closed internal structure on the basis of whether or not their OPESCO values are larger 
than the median of all samples, 43.3% of the responding open JSCs (176 firms out of 
406) have closed internal structures, whereas 32.0% of the responding closed JSCs (47 
firms out of 147) have open structures; that is, according to the discussions in Section 
1.3, four of ten of the firms surveyed have already achieved or are in the process of 
achieving  a  function-neutralizing  complementary  equilibrium  as  the  institutional 
arrangement for the internal governance system. 
 
1.5. Institutional Equilibrium and Organizational Behavior 
As noted in the previous section, an asymmetrical institutional arrangement between a 
corporate  form  and  its  internal  structure  is  a  noticeable  phenomenon  that  divides 
medium-sized and large JSCs, which are a core component of the Russian business 
sector,  into  two  types.    Therefore,  as  long  as  the  qualitative  differences  in  an 
institutional equilibrium affect organizational behavior to a certain degree, that fact 
may be of great significance not only to their corporate performance but also to the 
Russian economy as a whole.    In this section, this issue will be closely examined. 
1.5.1. Working Hypotheses 
The  theoretical  study  of  institutional  diversity  and  imperfect  institutions  has  made 
remarkable  progress  in  recent  years  (Young,  1998;  Aoki,  2001;  Eggertsson,  2005; 
Ostrom,  2005).    Although  such  research  lacks  precision  in  assessing  how  an 
institutional equilibrium affects the behavioral pattern of an economic entity, including Chapter 1 
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a corporation, it provides highly suggestive clues to elucidating this mechanism.    The 
organizational  economics  also  gives  helpful  hints  on  this  topic.    Based  on  recent 
developments  of  institutional  and  organizational  studies  in  economics,  we  propose 
three  working  hypotheses  with  regard  to  the  causality  between  institutional 
arrangements  of  corporate  forms  and  the  internal  structures  in  Russian  stock 
companies and organizational behavior, including corporate performance. 
First, the institutional arrangement of corporate form and internal organizational 
structure  in  a  stock  company  may  be  closely  linked  with  the  probability  of  the 
occurrence  of  infighting  between  management  and  shareholders.    An  institutional 
equilibrium in a corporate organization, which is reached as the result of a bargaining 
game between managers and owners over corporate control, brings a degree of stability 
to the company management but does not prevent all  kinds of conflicts of interest 
between  the  two  parties  stemming  from  changes  in  the  outer  environment  and 
opportunistic  behavior  of  the  corporate  executives.    The  probability  of  such  a 
disagreement  between  the  managers  and  the  shareholders  developing  into  serious 
infighting  largely  depends  on  the  degree  of  freedom  of  the  shareholder  voice  in 
management and exit from ownership.    In other words, the more institutionally open a 
company is, the more effective it will be at reducing the risk of internal conflict. 
Secondly,  function-neutralizing  complementarity  between  corporate  forms  and 
internal structures is  inferior to function-enhancing  complementarity as  institutional 
coordination, in the sense that the additional openness of the internal organizational 
structure  in  closed  JSCs  may  be  less  effective  to  deter  internal  conflicts  between 
corporate  managers  and  shareholders  than  that  in  open  companies  ceteris  paribus.   
The  reasons  for the relatively  low degree  of  the  marginal  functional  strength  of  a 
function-neutralizing  complementary  equilibrium  are  that  no  synergetic  effects 
between functionally compatible institutions can be expected and systemic distortion 
(coordination loss) may occur by coupling function-incompatible institutions. 
Finally, the institutional equilibrium of corporate form and internal structure in a 
stock  company  have  only  an  indirect  impact  on  its  productivity  as  well  as  on  its 
investment and restructuring  activities since, although  it  is true that the above  two Chapter 1 
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elements  play  a  significant  role  in  disciplining  corporate  officers  and  ensuring 
organizational stabilization through the definition of power balance between managers 
and  shareholders,  it  is  equally  true  that  a  corporate  performance  in  Russia  is  also 
largely  affected  by  the  business  environment,  the  quality  of  its  managers, 
labor-management relationships, financial constraints, and the interrelationships with 
business  partners  and  the  state.    In  particular,  in  transitional  Russia,  corporate 
management is seriously crippled by hardening budget constraints, given the uncertain 
political  and  economic  situation,  as  well  as  its  underdeveloped  capital  market  and 
banking system.    Therefore, it appears to be difficult to find an empirical relationship 
between  institutional  arrangement  in  a  Russian  stock  company  and  its  corporate 
performance. 
1.5.2. Institutional Equilibrium and its Impact on Internal Conflicts 
In order to substantiate the first and second hypothesis presented above, we perform a 
probit  estimation  of  qualitative  choice  models  using  the  following  two  kinds  of 
dependent variables.    One is an internal-conflict dummy variable (INTCON), which 
takes a value of 1 if the company has experienced harsh infighting between managers 
and shareholders at least once from 2001 to 2004, and the other is a CEO-displacement 
dummy (CEOTUR), in which the value of 1 is assigned to companies that saw CEO 
turnover  at  the  request  of  shareholders  at  least  once  during  the  same  period.   
According  to our  survey results, 206 (26.8%) of the 768 firms  had more than one 
internal conflict, and 170 (20.7%) of the 821 firms changed their top management as a 
result  of  pressure  from  their  shareholders.    Karpoff  and  Rice  (1989)  regard 
managerial turnover as a proxy variable to measure the magnitude of a control contest 
or shareholder disagreement.    Our CEOTUR variable may  have the same function.   
However,  managerial  turnovers  in  Russia  are  generally  regarded  as  an  arbitration 
process  applied  to  reduce  conflict  between  manager  and  shareholders  and  reach 
settlements outside of courts.    In fact, of the 767 surveyed firms that answered both 
the question of whether or not they had an internal conflict from 2001 to 2004 and 
whether or not they had a CEO displacement during the same period, only 53 (33.5%) Chapter 1 
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of  the  158  companies  answered  “yes”  to  both  questions.    This  suggests  that  the 
probability  of  a  shareholder-initiated  managerial  turnover  is  closely  but  negatively 
associated with the probability of corporate infighting.    Therefore, it is presumed that 
a  corporate  organization  open  to  outside  shareholders  deters  internal  conflicts  and 
increases the likelihood of shareholder-initiated CEO turnovers. 
In order to examine the impact of corporate form and internal structure in a stock 
company as well as the impact of the institutional arrangement on the probability of 
such  organizational  behavior,  we  estimate  probit  models  aimed  at  verifying  the 
individual effects of the corporate form and internal structure as well as the synergistic 
effects  generated  by  the  institutional  coordination  of  these  two  elements.  The 
individual effects of the corporate form and internal structure are estimated using the 
following equation, which takes an open JSC dummy (OPECOM) and OPESCO as the 
explanatory  variables  together  with  the  variables  controlling  ownership  structure 
(OWNOUT,  MANSHA),  the  relationship  with business  groups  (GROFIR),  the  gross 
sales change from 2001 to 2004 (SALGRO) representing the management condition in 
that period, and the size and sector of the given surveyed firm (COMSIZ and industrial 
dummy variables): 
Pr[INTCON=1 or CEOTUR=1] = F(constant, OPECOM, OPESCO, OWNOUT, 
MANSHA, GROFIR, SALGRO, COMSIZ, industrial dummies) 
On  the  other  hand,  the  synergistic  effect  of  the  institutional  coordination  of  a 
corporate form and  internal structure is estimated on the basis of two  sub-samples 
representing open and closed JSCs using the above  formula but without OPECOM 
variable.    Meanwhile, as panel (a) in Table 1.8 shows, according to the Ȥ
2-test of 
difference  of  the  proportion  in  all  available  samples  of  firms  that  saw  an  internal 
conflict and/or had a shareholder-initiated CEO turnover at least once in 2001-04, there 
was no statistically significant difference between open and closed JSCs, whereas the 
difference between two company groups divided on the basis of the median value of 
OPESCO  is  significant  at  the  5%  level  in  terms  of  the  probability  of  an  internal 
conflict as well as at the 1% level with regard to the probability of CEO turnover. Chapter 1 
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In consideration of the possible reverse-causality in which an internal conflict or 
CEO turnover occurred in the past may affect directly or indirectly the current state of 
the governance system, the sample for the probit estimation is limited to 321 firms that 
did  not  experience  changes  in  major  shareholders  from  2001  to  2004,  that  is, 
companies whose ownership structure remained almost constant during that period.   
This sample constraint is considered to be quite effective in ruling out the possibility of 
the  aforementioned  reverse-causality,  since  it  is  a  well-known  fact  that  almost  all 
large-scale  internal  structural  changes  in  Russian  firms  are  triggered  by  a  shift  in 
dominant shareholders resulting from a hostile takeover or merger. 
The  regression  results  are  shown  in  Table  1.9.
29    These  models  highlight  the 
analytical importance of institutional coordination of corporate organization and the 
outstanding effect of the function-enhancing institutional complementary in a clearer 
fashion than we expected.      The corporate form alone does not have any significant 
impact on the probability of an internal conflict and a CEO turnover.    In addition, the 
internal structure alone does not effectively deter internal conflicts.    On the contrary, 
an increase in the openness of an open company’s internal structure positively affects 
the prevention of corporate infighting and expansion of the shareholders’  influence 
over the managerial selection process, and its magnitude and statistical significance are 
larger than that for an internal structure’s individual effects.
30    In contrast, a closed 
company’s  attempts  to  design  a  more  open  internal  structure  end  up  with  no 
statistically  significant  result.    Here,  it  is  strongly  suggested  that  the 
                                                         
29  Again,  all  of the  correlation coefficients among the independent  variables  used in these 
models were below a threshold of 0.70.    In addition, all models were re-estimated by logit 
and yielded the same as those shown in Table 1.9. 
30  To check the robustness of these estimation results, we also conducted the estimation based 
on more constrained observations by excluding all the communications firms from the basic 
sample  and  by  excluding  the  largest  companies,  as  we  did  for  the  estimation  of  the 
corporate-form choice model in Subsection 1.3.2, and we found that there is no remarkable 
change in the  coefficients and statistical significances  of OPESCO in these re-estimated 
models. Chapter 1 
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function-enhancing complementary between corporate form and internal organizational 
structure in a stock company can produce considerable synergistic effects, and, on the 
contrary,  that  the  function-neutralizing  institutional  complementary  may  be 
accompanied by a serious coordination loss to corporate management. 
On the other hand, in the light of empirical evidence on the corporate governance 
of  Russian  firms,  it  is  quite  suggestive  that  OWNOUT  has  a  positive  sign  with 
statistical  significance  in  many  cases  and  MANSHA  is  negative  and  significant  in 
Model (D) and Model (E) using CEOTUR as the dependent variable.
31    Furthermore, 
the result that SALGRO is not significant as the explanatory variable for the probability 
of  an  internal  conflict  and  CEO  turnover  except  for  Model  (C)  is  consistent  with 
preceding studies, in which it was repeatedly maintained that the managerial turnover 
in Russian firms was not sensitive to their performance, although there is room for 
improvement in the  analysis method on this problem (Iwasaki, 2006).
32    Hence, it 
may be said that, in Russia, corporate infighting and CEO turnover need to be seen in 
the context of power struggles between managers and outside investors rather than in 
the context of shareholders’ complaints blaming managers for poor performance or 
company scandals. 
1.5.3. Institutional Equilibrium and its Impact on Corporate Performance 
The third hypothesis regarding the causality between the institutional equilibrium and 
corporate performance is  supported by  the survey results.    Panel (b) in  Table 1.8 
shows  comparisons of  two sample  groups  classified  by  corporate  form  and  by the 
degree of openness of their internal structure on the basis of a total of thirteen criteria.   
                                                         
31  We  re-estimated  all  models  in  Table  1.9,  excluding  ownership  variables  from  the 
independent  variables,  and  confirmed  that  this treatment  did  not  have  any  influence  on 
OPECOM and OPESCO. 
32  Instead  of  SALGRO,  the  proit  estimation  was  also  performed  using  variables  for  labor 
productivity of a company, its financial and economic condition assessed by managers, and 
dividend distribution frequency as a proxy of management performance, and none of them 
produced significant results. Chapter 1 
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Six of them, including labor productivity and changes in  gross sales, are related to 
business performance for the past several years, and the remaining seven, including the 
intensiveness  of  investment  activities  and  changes  in  R&D  expenditure,  reflect 
restructuring activities. 
In each of these two types of comparisons, no significant difference was observed 
in  more  than  half  of  the  criteria.    In  addition,  none  of  the  regression  analyses 
conducted  with  these  performance  indices  as  the  dependent  variables  produced 
systematically significant results with respect to the corporate-form dummy variable, 
OPESCO, and the interaction term of these variables.
33    The above empirical results 
allow  us  to  surmise  that  an  institutional  equilibrium  between  corporate  form  and 
internal organizational structure in a Russian JSC is less likely to have a direct impact 
on its corporate performance. 
 
1.6. Concluding Remarks 
In  Russia,  an  overwhelming  number  of  JSCs  choose  to  become  closed  companies 
despite the fact that this corporate form strays far from the primary nature of stock 
companies,  that  is,  raising  funds  from  a  wide  variety  of  sources  in  a  modern  and 
democratic  manner.    This  trend  is  equally  obvious  for  medium-sized  and  large 
enterprises  in  the  manufacturing  and  communications  sectors.    In  this  study,  we 
attempted to conduct theoretical and empirical examinations on this quite interesting 
organizational  behavior  using  the  results  of  a  large-scale  enterprise  survey  we 
conducted in the 64 federal regions in the first half of 2005. 
In the first part of the chapter, we illuminated the mechanism of the organizational 
choice between two alternative corporate forms, i.e., open versus closed JSCs, and 
identified the following four factors encouraging many of Russian firms to be closed 
                                                         
33  In  almost  all  of  these  regression  results,  the  explanatory  variables  representing  the 
relationship  with  a  business  group,  the  company  size,  and  the  financial  constraints  on 
corporate management were estimated with high statistical significance, which also supports 
the third hypothesis. Chapter 1 
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companies:  (a)  a  widespread  insider-dominating  corporate  ownership  structure 
emerging as a result of the mass-privatization policy; (b) a strong orientation among 
managers toward closed corporate organization due to the underdeveloped capital and 
managerial  markets;  (c)  slumping  needs  for  corporate  finance;  and  (d)  insufficient 
financial  support  from  local  financial  institutions.    The  empirical  relation  between 
ownership structure and corporate form dose exist, even if we assume the endogeneity 
of  the  two  elements.    The  fact  that  the  above  four  factors  still  have  a  significant 
impact  on  the  behavioral  patterns  of  Russian  corporations  even  after  well  over  a 
decade  since  the  collapse  of  the  Soviet  Union  reminds  us  of  the  difficult  and 
time-consuming  transition  process  from  a  centrally  planned  to  a  market-based 
economic system. 
In  the  latter  half  of  this  chapter,  we  examined  the  institutional  coordination 
between  corporate  forms  and  internal  organizational  structures  in  Russian  stock 
companies and its impact on organizational behavior.    The provisions of the law on 
JSCs force Russian firms to choose between an open or a closed JSC as their legal 
form  of  incorporation,  resulting  in  the  emergence  of  the  two  contrasting  types  of 
institutional  equilibria.    The  reason  that  some  Russian  enterprises  try  to  add  a 
reverse-functional  aspect  to  their  internal  structures  needs  to  be  understood  in  the 
context of their economically rational organizational behavior in an attempt to attain an 
ideal  degree  of organizational openness  (or  closedness)  and  to optimize the  power 
balance  between  managers  and  shareholders  by  adjusting  the  excessive  functional 
strengths  of  their  corporate  form,  which  are  exogenous  to  them.    Such  an 
organizational  reaction  of  Russian  firms  to  the  corporate  law  probably  plays  an 
important role in enabling them to perform stable business operations on a “peacetime” 
basis.    According to the empirical evidence derived in the previous section, however, 
compared with a function-enhancing complementary equilibrium coupling functionally 
compatible  institutions,  the  function-neutralizing  complementary  equilibrium  works 
quite ineffective in preventing internal conflicts as well as in allowing shareholders to 
dismiss managers, both of which are critical challenges facing corporate governance in 
Russia today. Chapter 1 
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Now, Russia is required to build a legal framework that can eliminate the need for 
enterprises  to  maintain  the  inefficient  institutional  equilibrium  of  corporate 
organization.    Nevertheless, it would be difficult to achieve this objective in a way 
that obliges all stock companies to become open JSCs, as has been proposed by the 
lower  house  of  the  Federal  Assembly  (The  State  Duma)  and  is  currently  being 
discussed  within  the  federal  government  (Osipenko,  2005).
34    The  most  essential 
policy  solution  is  to  facilitate  an  environment  that  motivates  Russian  firms  to 
voluntarily  unlock  their  organizations.    Without  this  condition,  the  convergence 
policy of the corporate forms into open JSCs may drive more companies towards a 
function-neutralizing complementary equilibrium.    After all, the sound development 
of the Russian business sector can be achieved only by promoting the transition to a 
market  economy  in  parallel  with  an  effort  to  move  forward  with  appropriate  and 
comprehensive structural reforms.    There is no shortcut to this process. 
                                                         
34  I would like to thank Andrei A. Yakovlev for providing information on this matter. Chapter 1 
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Share transferability No restrictions are imposed on share transfers.  No preferred
purchase rights may be arranged for any shareholders,
including the company, in terms of the transfer of shares to
third parties (Art. 7(2)).
The company shareholders have the right to purchase the
shares of other shareholders in preference to third parties.
The company may exercise such a preferred purchase right
only when no shareholder exercises the same right (Art. 7(3)).
Share subscription Open JSCs are incorporated by having all of their shares
subscribed by their promoters or by having some of their
shares subscribed by their promoters and the remaining shares
subscribed by other investors (Art. 7(2)).  After incorporation,
they can make a public share placement without any
restriction (Art. 39(1) & Art. 39(2)).
Closed JSCs are incorporated only by having all of their
shares subscribed by their promoters.  All of their shares
issued after their incorporation must be offered only to their




Open JSCs may issue any kinds of bonds, including
convertible bonds, to the public in accordance with the
procedures set by law (Art. 39(2)).
Closed JSCs are prohibited from issuing convertible bonds to




1000 times the minimum statutory wage on the date of
registration (Art. 26).
100 times the minimum statutory wage on the date of
registration (Art. 26).
Number of shareholders No upper limit is placed on the number of shareholders (Art.
7(2)).
The upper limit on the number of shareholders is 50 (Art.
7(3)).  However, this limit does not apply to closed JSCs
established by the end of 1995 (Art. 94(4)).
State involvement in
investment
The state may not become the promoter of a joint-stock
company, in principle (Art. 10(1)).  However, state agencies
may become the promoters of open JSCs in certain cases as
provided for by law (Art. 7(4)).
Only former state-owned enterprises and other former
municipal enterprises may become the promoters of closed
JSCs (Art. 7(4)).
Disclosure requirements Open JSCs are required to disclose certain information as
requested by the law on JSCs and other statutes and by
government agencies (Art. 92(1)).
Closed JSCs that issue bonds or securities at the same price
and in the same manner as instructed by the Federal Financial
Markets Service (FFMS) are required to disclose certain
information in accordance with the rules adopted by the
FFMS (Art. 92(2)).
Source: The Federal Law on Joint-Stock Companies of the Russian Federation.




























































** -0.113 -0.116 -0.175
* -0.124
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(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Industrial dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 557 555 555 557 525 534 389 527
Pseudo R
2 0.19 0.20 0.21 0.19 0.16 0.19 0.17 0.17
Log likelihood -295.70 -290.69 -286.06 -295.44 -283.83 -284.18 -211.91 -282.43
Source: Author's estimation.  See Appendix for the definition, descriptive statistics, and data source of variables used in models.
Ⅳ Ⅰ
(A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (F) (G) (H)
 b
c The coefficients represent marginal effects.  White's heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are shown in parentheses.  ***: significant at the
1% level; **: at the 5% level;  *: at the 10% level.
Notes: 
a I: basic sample (available observations without firms that already issued securities in the past); II: excluding communications firms from
the basic sample; III: excluding those with the total number of employees exceeding the mean of number of employees of closed JSCs (794.19
person) plus/minus 1 standard deviation (3,149.14) from the basic sample; IV: excluding those that experienced a change in the major shareholders
from 2001 to 2004 from the basic sample.
b The two-stage probit estimation assuming the endogeneity between corporate form and ownership structure.
CLOCOM
Ⅰ Ⅰ Ⅰ Ⅰ Ⅱ Ⅲ
 46Note: ME - mean value; SD - standard deviation; KU – kurtosis; SK – skewness



















































































































































(0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
MANSHA 0.045 0.051 0.005 -0.173
*** -0.149
*** -0.169
(0.05) (0.06) (0.12) (0.05) (0.05) (0.11)
GROFIR -0.047 -0.069 -0.132 0.066 0.150
** -0.034
(0.06) (0.07) (0.12) (0.05) (0.06) (0.03)
SALGRO -0.021 -0.010 -0.090
** 0.011 -0.003 0.014
(0.02) (0.02) (0.04) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01)
COMSIZ 0.006 0.024 -0.073 -0.015 -0.025 0.008
(0.02) (0.03) (0.05) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01)
Industrial dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 317 238 74 321 237 73
Pseudo R
2 0.07 0.08 0.14 0.17 0.17 0.43





Table 1.9: Probit regression analysis of the impacts of the institutional
coordination of corporate form and internal organizational structure in a
joint-stock company on the probability of internal conflicts and CEO turnover
INTCON CEOTUR
Closed JSCs Open JSCs Closed JSCs
All
companies
Source: Author's estimation.  See Appendix for the definition, descriptive statistics, and data source of variables used
in models.
(E)
Note: The coefficients represent marginal effects.   White's heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are shown in
parentheses.  ***: significant at the 1% level; **: at the 5% level;  *: at the 10% level.
(F) (A) (C) (D)
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Mean S.D. Min. Max.
CLOCOM Closed JSC dummy 0.33 0.47 0 1
OPECOM Open JSC dummy 0.67 0.47 0 1
OWNOUT Outsider ownership share 
a 1.87 2.14 0 5
OWNSTA State ownership share 0.37 1.02 0 5
OWNFED Ownership share by federal government agencies 0.23 0.82 0 5
OWNREG Ownership share by regional and local government agencies 0.17 0.70 0 5
OWNPRI Private ownership share 1.26 1.90 0 5
OWNBAN Ownership share by commercial banks 0.11 0.50 0 5
OWNFIN Ownership share by investment funds and other financial institutions 0.16 0.68 0 5
OWNCOR Ownership share by non-financial corporate shareholders 0.88 1.65 0 5
OWNFOR Ownership share by foreign investors 0.22 0.88 0 5
MANSHA Large managerial shareholder dummy 0.51 0.50 0 1
SECPLA Securities issuance planning dummy 0.06 0.29 0 2
RELBAN Relationship-banking dummy 0.82 0.39 0 1
NUMFIN Number of financial institutions per 1000 firms in the location 1.19 0.31 0.54 2.18
GROFIR Business group participation dummy 0.33 0.47 0 1
GROCOR Core business group member dummy 0.05 0.22 0 1
GROAFF Business group affiliation dummy 0.28 0.45 0 1
GROSIZ Natural logarithm of the total number of member firms of a business group 0.68 1.13 0 6.40
PRICOM Dummy for former state-owned or ex-municipal privatized companies 0.69 0.46 0 1
SPIOFF Dummy for firms separated from state-owned or privatized companies 0.10 0.30 0 1
COMSIZ Natural logarithm of the total number of employees 6.16 0.93 4.66 9.42
CEOSHA Dummy of shareholding by incumbent CEO (or company president) 0.63 0.48 0 1
DOMSHA Dummy of a shareholder/shareholder group dominating corporate management 0.87 0.33 0 1
CEOAGE Age level of incumbent CEO (or company president)
 b 2.43 0.91 0 5
COMDOM Intensity of competition with domestic firms in product market
 c 1.50 0.69 0 2
OPESCO Indicator of the openness of the internal organizational structure -0.09 1.06 -2.91 2.02
INTCON Internal conflict dummy 0.27 0.44 0 1
CEOTUR Shareholder-initiated CEO turnover dummy 0.21 0.41 0 1
SALGRO Changes in gross sales 
d 1.62 1.27 -1 3
b Age level is rated on the following 6-point scale: 0: 30 years old or less; 1: 31-40 years old; 2: 41-50 years old; 3: 51-60 years old; 4: 61-70 years old; 5:
71 years old or more.
c  The intensity of competition is rated on the following 3-point scale: 0: no competition; 1: not very competitive; 2: very competitive.
Appendix.  Definition, descriptive statistics, and data source of variables used for empirical Analysis
d The changes are rated on the following 5-point scale: -2: decreased by 20% or more; -1: decreased by less than 20%; 0: no change; 1: increased by less
than 20%; 2: increased by 20% or more.
Notes:  
a  "Ownership share," as used herein, means an ownership share rated on the following 6-point scale: 0: 0%; 1: 10.0% or less; 2: 10.1 to 25.0%; 3:
25.1 to 50.0%; 4: 50.1 to 75.0%; 5: 75.1 to 100.0%.
Data source: NUMFIN was calculated by the author based on Rosstat (2005) and the Central Bank of the Russian Federation (2005).  Other variables are
based on the results of the Japan-Russia joint enterprise survey conducted in 2005.
Descriptive statistics
Variable name Definition
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and  file  workers  to  managers,  from  working  teams  as  a  whole  to outside  owners, 
against  a  background  of  concentration  of  stock  ownership.  Under  a  deep 
transformation slump and high inflation, limitations in the ways of exercising property 
rights (non-liquidity of shares, absence of dividend payments, and withdrawal of assets 
from enterprises for the sake of managers and certain owners) gave the shareholders 
incentives for concentration of corporate ownership in order to gain legitimate control 
over joint stock companies (JSCs). 
Russian corporate sector, in the atmosphere of imperfect legal institutions, took 
the predictable way of creation of a type of large shareholder, an owner of stakes that 
could give him the right to control executives (Stiglitz, 1999). Privatised enterprises 
evolved in this direction, while newly established companies, as a rule, belonged to 
large  shareholders  from  the  outset.  Let  us  notice  that  well-known  international 
comparisons demonstrate a great variety of ownership structures and types of corporate 
control, dispersed ownership being rather an exception to the rule (La Porta et al., 
1999). High level of ownership concentration is natural to many transitional economies 
in spite of differences in initial ways of privatisation and in the quality of institutions 
(Berglof and Pajuste, 2003; Andreff, 2005; Kapelyushnikov, 2005). 
As  shown  by  surveys  conducted  in  recent  years  by  the  Bureau  of  Economic 
Analysis, the SU-HSE, the Russian Economic Barometer (REB), the Institute for the 
Economy  in Transition and other think tanks, high  level of capital concentration is 
typical of Russian companies, and this level is rising year by year. According to the 
data  of  a  number  of  studies  (Radygin  and  Entov,  2001;  Dolgopyatova  (ed), 2003; 
Guriev et al., 2003; Yasin (ed), 2004; Kapelyushnikov and Dyomina, 2005), in the 
early  2000s  the  stake  of  the  largest  shareholder  in  equity  stock  of  an  industrial 
enterprise was about 30-50%. The share of JSCs where an owner of a blocking stake 
was present, reached 40-65% of the total number of surveyed firms, and the share of 
JSCs with an owner of a controlling block of shares was 30-40%. The respondents 
indicated (Golikova et al., 2003) that even among open JSCs, almost two thirds had a 
shareholder,  which  kept  them  under  control.  On  the  other  hand,  in-depth  surveys 
(interviews, case studies), as a rule, gave evidence of a substantially higher actual level Chapter 2 
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of concentration (TTPP, 2004; Yasin (ed), 2004). 
Dynamic  processes  of  property  redistribution  created  large  owners.  Corporate 
governance  is  ruled  by  interests  of  dominant  shareholders  who  are  restrained  by 
nothing  but  a  requirement  to  comply  with  the  existing  legal  regulations,  which  is 
usually done by means of imitation of compliance. In the prevailing model of corporate 
governance these shareholders directly participate in governing the companies as their 
top managers. Inseparability of ownership and control has become a formal institution 
in the Russian corporate practice, constraining demand for hired managers. This type 
of  institution  became  widespread  not  only  as  an  outcome  of  privatisation  (a  ‘red 
director’ – an enterprise owner), but also as an instrument deliberately chosen by an 
owner  –  entrepreneur.  The  latter,  given  the  situation  when  markets  for  managerial 
labour and institutions for protection of property rights were underdeveloped, preferred 
to rely on this instrument rather than to bear high costs of prevention of opportunistic 
behaviour, which was practiced by hired managers in such extreme ways as withdrawal 
of assets and seizure of businesses. 
Opportunities for gaining control are supported with other formal institutions (for 
instance, such as holding company groups based on contractual or property relations), 
and with certain informal practices. These practices include direct interference of large 
proprietors  in  corporate  activities  and  their  excessive  command  over  operational 
decisions  made  by  managers,  in  particular,  over  their  financial  operations.  Such 
practices actually bring managerial decision making beyond the bounds of the area of 
corporate governance procedures. 
Making  conjectures  about  evolution  of  the  Russian  system  of  corporate 
governance may follow, it is interesting to find an answer to a question, which model 
of governance a dominant shareholder will choose and whether he will or will not 
consent to formal  separation  of  executive management  from  ownership.  A  shift  to 
reliance on hired management will make the owner try to look for different methods of 
control  over  the  business entity, and  he may  possibly resort  to the use  of  internal 
corporate mechanisms. Inseparability of management and ownership is an instrument 
for control and for protection of shareholders. But it can be either substituted with Chapter 2 
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other methods or complement these methods (super-high concentration of capital, legal 
form  of  a  closed  join-stock  company,  participation  in  a  business  group  based  on 
property and other relations). 
In  recent  years,  when  corporate  integration  of  Russian  enterprises  gained 
substantial strength, composition of dominant shareholders changed a great deal, as 
well as the ways they exercise corporate control in their companies. Expanding the 
boundaries  of  a  firm,  integration  transforms  the  relations  between  participants  of 
corporate  governance.  Having  defined  that  a  formal  indicator  of  separation  of 
management  from  ownership  is  presence  of  a  hired  general  director  (CEO)  in  the 
absence  of  large  stakes  of  shares  in the  hands  of  other managers, we  disclosed  in 
(Dolgopyatova, 2004), using the data of a limited number of interviews, that separation 
is typical of ordinary member firms of holding company groups (or business groups). 
However, if an enterprise presented a whole business (being an independent entity or a 
parent enterprise in a group of companies), it’s dominating owners preferred to have a 
formally fixed inseparability of functions. Separation of ownership from management 
came  with  a  higher  degree  of  capital  concentration  and  was  followed  by  dynamic 
change  of  top  managers  and  by  emergence  of  modern  managerial  teams. 
Representatives of shareholders prevailed in boards of directors, while inseparability of 
ownership  and  management  usually  charges  managers  with  responsibilities  of  the 
boards. In the latter case, shareholders, executive and non-executive directors make a 
unified  group that represents  itself  across all  corporate  bodies  of  management  and 
places intra-corporate procedures under its control. 
The goals of this chapter are either to confirm or to disprove these conclusions 
with  the  data  of  a  large  sample,  and  to  examine  other  outcomes  of  separation  of 
management activities in the companies. The issue of informal control mechanisms 
that are used by dominating owners is set aside. We suppose that at the present time, 
separation of management from ownership is an integral feature of a substantial part of 
Russian joint stock companies, mostly to member firms of business groups, and it is 
typical of the firms that have to deal with sophisticated managerial problems requiring 
particular professional knowledge and skills (firms of larger scale, belonging to certain Chapter 2 
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industries). We also suppose that separation of management from ownership affects 
corporate governance and corporate finance policy in the firms that have chosen this 
organizational pattern of control. On the one hand, intensity of corporate conflicts can 
be expected to rise due to the emerging agency problem, and on the other hand, boards 
of  directors  and  other  corporate  bodies  can  be  expected  to  take  stronger  hand  in 
supervising activities of executives. 
 
2.2. Ownership Structure in Joint-Stock Companies: New Empirical Data 
2.2.1. Capital Concentration 
Our  survey  confirmed  once  again  that  the  degree  of  ownership  concentration  is 
extremely high. The indicators we have used show the presence of a shareholder or a 
consolidated  group  of  shareholders  who  possess  large  blocks  of  shares  and  have 
control over their companies. If we exclude those that had ‘difficulty in answering’, 4 
out of 5 JSCs had an owner of a blocking package of shares at the survey moment, and 
about 70% had an owner of more than a half of the stock. In the latter category, only 
30% of the respondents mentioned that they had another large shareholder owning a 
blocking stake. This level of capital concentration was regarded by almost 70% of the 
respondents as optimal for development of their businesses; about 18% wished it to 
make it higher, and 13%, to make it lower. Great majority of the respondents – more 
than 87% declared that their companies already has an owner (or a stable coalition of 
owners) who exercised control over their enterprises. 
All JSCs can be divided into 3 groups: in the first, level of concentration is high 
(the largest owner has more than 50% of the stock); in the second, it is medium (this 
share is from 25% to 50% inclusive), and in the third, it is low (the largest owner has 
less than 25% of the stock). Meanwhile, the group of companies with high level of 
concentration has 2 sub-groups, which differ by presence or absence of another large 
shareholder. Absence of such a shareholder may imply in particular that the owner of a 
controlling block has a still heavier stake. Actually, this sample is dominated by the 
companies with  an owner of a controlling block of shares, and at almost a half of Chapter 2 
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entities  this  owner  isn’t  limited  by  the  power  of  another  large  shareholder  –  a 
counterweight to his influence (Figure 2.1). 
A higher capital concentration could be expected to be typical of closed JSCs and 
of newly established businesses, in contrast to privatised enterprises, which contain a 
still non-vanished class of petty shareholders. Besides, the companies whose securities 
are listed on the stock exchanges could also have lower levels of capital concentration. 
Our  survey  gave different results.
1  Distribution  of  enterprises  by degree  of  capital 
concentration was almost the same irregardless of industry sectors and sizes (tests for 
equality of means and medians were given extra verification), organizational forms, 
historical backgrounds of JSCs, and listing of their securities on Russian or foreign 
bourses.  The  only  established  difference  was  that  another  large  shareholder  was 
present in 35% of joint stock companies that had been founded after January 1, 1992, 
and only in 19% of those that had been privatised or reorganized upon a merger or a 
spin-off. 
Although high concentration of ownership became a universal feature of Russian 
companies,  there was a  significant link between  its  level and  corporate  integration 
(Figure 2.2). Typically, the enterprises that are ordinary members of company groups 
have much higher concentration than independent JSCs and parent companies. Let us 
notice that presence of another large shareholder was more often a feature of parent 
companies: they were present at every third entity this category, against every fifth in 
the rest. Absence of such a ‘counterweight’ to the dominant shareholder was observed 
at  almost  60%  of  ordinary  members  of  business  groups,  against  a  third  of  parent 
companies and 44% of independent JSCs. 
The  higher  was  capital  concentration,  the  more  often  it  was  preceded  with 
vigorous  redistribution  of  ownership.  In  2001-2004,  change  of  major  owners  was 
typical of 30% of enterprises in the whole sample, but it happened twice more frequent 
under high than under low capital concentration. It was most frequent in the sub-group 
                                                         
1  Here and further (in the absence of other direct stipulations) results of statistical tests for 
verification of correlations between variables and for comparison of means and medians are 
considered valid if the threshold of significance is less than 0.05. Chapter 2 
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with a second centre of control, where it took place at more than 39% of companies. 
Apparently, change of ownership followed by consolidation of capital gave a stimulus 
to modernize all bodies of corporate management (see details in Subsection 2.4.4). 
2.2.2. Structure of Stock Ownership 
Analysing the structure of stock ownership, we gave up the division of the circle of 
shareholders into workers and outside owners, which had been traditionally made in 
preceding studies and had been rooted in the usual dichotomy of the 1990s between 
‘insiders’  and  ‘outsiders’.  In  a  different  context,  taking  into  account  that  the  term 
‘insider’ refers to all large owners including persons that don’t work in a company 
(Dolgopyatova (ed), 2003), we have turned our attention to comparison of participation 
of large and minority shareholders. In the total sample (Table 2.1), large individual 
shareholders prevail in the ownership of ordinary shares; dispersed minority individual 
shareholders  also  remain  a  sizeable  owner  as  a  combined  group,  and  Russian 
non-financial enterprises have occupied the third place in the list. Ownership of banks, 
other financial investors, as well as of regional administrations is scanty, and the share 
of foreign investors is modest. 
As in the case of concentration of equity, corporate integration has affected its 
structure. Much higher percentage of minority shareholders is a feature of independent 
companies. Ordinary members of holding company groups have higher percentage of 
ownership of federal authorities and Russian legal entities, and parent companies have 
bigger stakes in the hands of large shareholders and foreign investors. In general, the 
entities that present a whole business usually  have a higher percentage of minority 
shareholders  along  with  significantly  lower  weight  of  other  types  of  shareholders 
except regional and local administrations and large individual shareholders. 
Turning  to  a  comparison  of  structures  of  equity  capital  at  different  levels  of 
concentration  (Table  2.2),  we  find  that  highly  concentrated  companies  have  a  lower 
weight  of  minority  shareholders  and  the  highest  percentage  of  Russian  non-financial 
organizations.  On  the other  hand,  JSCs  with medium  level  of  concentration  have the 
highest percentage of federal shareholding. Besides, when we singled out the companies Chapter 2 
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with  presence/absence  of  counterweights,  we  found  that  their  capital  structures  were 
practically identical. 
Consequently, the structure of ownership of ordinary shares gives us confirmation 
of  high  capital  concentration  along  with  preservation  of  dispersed  ownership, 
prevalence  of  large  shareholders  and  non-financial  organizations.  Non-financial 
organizations are used as affiliated entities in order to ensure participation of large 
shareholders – owners of controlling blocks of shares. 
 
2.3.  Emergence  of  Types  of  Corporate  Control  under  Concentrated 
Ownership 
2.3.1  What  Kind  of  Companies  Typically  Have  Management  Separated  from 
Ownership 
In  our  survey,  we  have  used  two  variables  –  partial  indicators  of 
inseparability/separation of ownership and management. The first indicator is based on 
the question whether  large  shareholders work as company managers; the second  is 
based on the question whether the company’s CEO holds any company’s shares. In 
2005, setting aside those who felt ‘difficulty in answering’, large shareholders were 
managers in 48% of the surveyed companies, and the CEOs were their shareholders in 
63% of all cases. As could be expected, these indicators are significantly correlated. In 
83%  of  the  companies  where  large  shareholders  were  managers,  CEOs  were 
shareholders.  In  the  companies  where  large  shareholders  didn’t  become  managers, 
CEOs also owned shares in 44% of these cases. 
We have defined the group of JSCs where the respondents gave negative answers 
to both questions as a group where ownership is separated from management. The rest 
form  another  group  where  these  functions  are  non-separated,  although  patterns  of 
non-separation  are  different  (Figure  2.3).  This  group  includes  JSCs  where  large 
shareholders are managers, and at the same time, CEO is a shareholder (let us name it 
M&D_S).  We  defined  this  sub-group  as  ‘complete  inseparability’.  The  sub-group 
where large shareholders are company’s managers, but CEO isn’t a shareholder (M_S) Chapter 2 
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is relatively small. It may include enterprises where CEO’s ownership is concealed or 
where he is a hired manager, while managerial team has large shareholders in its ranks. 
Such a  situation  looks  infrequent;  it  is  usually  a  temporary  one or related  to  such 
matters as geographical remoteness of an enterprise from its main owners. We came 
across such cases in a number of in-depth interviews (Yasin (ed), 2004), and we define 
this situation as inseparability: company’s business is in the hands of managers. 
A substantial sub-group in which only the CEO is a shareholder (D_S) consists of 
companies where the top manager has a small or medium stake in capital. The CEO’s 
stake is either the result of privatization (among other reasons, because new owners 
tend  to  appoint  CEOs  from  the  ranks  of  former  managers,  which  are  minority 
shareholders), or because the owners endowed him with some shares. Even a modest 
stake in the hands of a top manager gives him additional control levers, especially in 
the  situations  where  working  teams  have  atomised  shares  or  where  public 
administration, which has a stake  in the capital, not always exercise their rights of 
control. This sub-group occupies an intermediate position, although many of such JSCs 
can be considered among the entities with inseparability of functions. 
A comparison between two basic groups of JSCs by essential characteristics of 
their businesses has revealed that they differ only by histories of their creation (for 
more  details  see  (Dolgopyatova  (ed),  2006).  Separation  of  ownership  from 
management  is  typical  of  new  and  re-organized  joint  stock  companies,  and 
inseparability, of the privatised ones. We have found that the group of companies with 
non-separated  ownership  and  management  is  heterogeneous  because  it  includes  a 
specific type of joint stock company with a CEO who is not a large shareholder. Such 
companies are much more frequently met in communications, among open joint stock 
companies, as well as among the privatised and the largest corporations. This is exactly 
the group where every fourth joint stock company has already listed its securities on 
Russian or foreign stock exchanges. 
We  have  found  that  patterns  of  combination  of  ownership  and  control  are 
different  in the joint stock  companies that present a whole business or a part of  a 
business (Figure 2.4). In accordance with our expectations, separation of ownership Chapter 2 
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from management is typical of the enterprises that are ordinary members of holding 
company groups, but independent firms and parent companies are mostly operated on 
the base of inseparability of these functions. Among  independent  firms, JSCs with 
‘complete  inseparability’  are  prevailing.  In  this  case  it  is  likely  to  compensate,  as 
instrument  for  control,  for  a  lower  degree  of  ownership  concentration.  The  stakes 
owned by a CEO are practically the same in all types of surveyed companies, but the 
few  cases  when  large  shareholders  take  part  in  management  not  being  CEOs  are 
generally typical of parent companies. 
In  the  entities  that  became  parts  of  a  business,  separation  of  ownership  from 
management goes together with higher concentration of capital, which displays itself in 
different ways in open and closed companies. In the JSCs presenting whole businesses, 
about a quarter of open companies and less than 18% of closed ones have separation. 
Members of holding company groups are in a reverse situation: separation is typical of 
40% of open against 52% of closed companies. The form of a close company and 
inseparability of management and ownership are two instruments of corporate control, 
which substitute each other. We believe that this notion has certain ground to be true 
(significance of the disclosed differences was 0.09). 
In  compliance  with  our  supposition,  separation  of  management  is  typical  of 
large-scale business groups with complicated management: massive groups with large 
numbers of employees in all its units, or holding company groups that are more widely 
dispersed geographically and diversified by industry. Going beyond the boundaries of 
a single region gives the companies with separated ownership and management almost 
20 percentage points of additional weight. Separation of functions is observed in 55% 
of conglomerates; at 10 percentage points fewer vertically integrated groups; but 65% 
of  members  of  horizontally  integrated  holding  company  groups  prefer  to  combine 
these functions. 
2.3.2. Ownership Structure and Organization of Corporate Control 
Choice of a configuration of ownership and management is predetermined by decisions 
made by dominating owners. We have found that separation of management was much Chapter 2 
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more often preceded with a change of main owners in 2001-2004, when almost 36% of 
all  JSCs  had  this  event  in  their  history.  The  greatest  stability  was  typical  of  the 
companies whose CEO was one of the shareholders, large as well as minority: in these 
two sub-groups, a quarter of companies changed their owners. The least stable was a 
small sub-group of JSCs  where large  shareholders were  managers (but not CEOs): 
about 48% of them were affected by redistribution of ownership rights. 
In the companies that differ by patterns of organization of control (Table 2.3), 
presence of a shareholder owning a blocking package of shares is the only fact that 
correlates with division of the sample: when ownership is separated from management, 
a shareholder owning a blocking package is found more often.   
Inseparability of the functions gives additional control tools, because even when 
capital concentration is lower, it helps to substantially increase the weight of JSCs with 
a dominating shareholder (by 20 points in comparison with holders of a controlling 
block of shares). In the companies where the stake of a CEO is not so large, degrees of 
ownership concentration and consolidation of control are much lower. Both ‘complete 
inseparability’ and the presence of a block of shares in the hands of a CEO help to 
make control stronger. Interestingly, the presence of another large shareholder has no 
effect on the organizational choice of combination of ownership and management. 
Turning to the structure of ownership of ordinary shares, we have found that when 
management is separated, shareholding of Russian non-financial companies is much 
higher, and when it is not, minority shareholders and banks have larger stakes. In the 
cases where small and medium stakes of CEOs are presented, federal authorities have 
larger stake. In the cases of ‘complete inseparability’ combined stakes in the hands of 
both large and minority shareholders are higher. In the presence of large shareholders 
who are managers, stakes of foreign investors are higher. 
 
2.4. Corporate Relations under Different Organizational Types of Control 
2.4.1. Intra-Corporate Conflicts 
Earlier  surveys  have  obtained  evidence  from  limited  numbers  of  companies  that Chapter 2 
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consolidation  of  ownership  and  control,  which  is  followed  with  crowding  out  or 
voluntary  departure  of  minority  shareholders  brings  stability  to  intra-corporate 
relations:  actual  number  of  corporate  conflicts  is  not  so  great,  and  is  very  much 
different from the impression that one can get from mass media. On the other hand, the 
level  of  conflicts  is  higher  in  the  firms  that  have  influential  minority  shareholders 
(foreign or institutional investors) and in public companies whose securities are listed 
on stock exchanges (TTPP, 2004). Taking in trust what our respondents are saying, in 
the period of 2001-2004 approximately 1 joint stock company out of 4 (6% a year on 
average) had disputes between shareholders or between them and managers. We found 
that the frequency of conflicts is independent from the industry the company belongs 
to or from its size, its financial condition and the degree of integration (the frequency 
was  the  same  in  whole  businesses  and  in  parts  of  businesses  as  well).  Other 
assumptions were not confirmed either. 
Although we anticipated that the agency problem would display itself, disputes 
arose  in a  quarter  of  companies under  separation  of ownership  from  management, 
against less than 29% of the rest of joint stock companies, and such differences are 
unimportant (sub-groups were homogeneous too). 
Along with relations between shareholders and managers, we also examined the 
practice of coordination of key decisions about future course of business devlopment 
with other participants in corporate governance (stakeholders). As we have found, the 
weight of companies that mentioned the existence of this practice is actually the same 
under the 2 basic models of control – 38 - 39%. And companies whose CEO is a 
shareholder  are  exceptional  –  a  half  of  them  practiced  such  coordination.  This 
sub-group  shows  a  much  stronger  inclination  to  consider  the  interests  of  federal, 
regional  and  local  administration,  labour  collectives,  and  the  banks  that  serve  the 
enterprises. It cannot be ruled out that this is the way the CEO who is not a large 
shareholder  tries  to  maintain  and  reinforce  his  influence,  and  it  may  happen  that 
outside owners let him hold this post because of these specific abilities. Chapter 2 
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2.4.2. Role of Corporate Bodies in Decision-making 
Turning to the roles of basic management bodies in corporate decision-making we can 
see  that  boards  of  directors  have  stronger  influence  than  shareholder  meetings  by 
respondents’ estimates (Table 2.4). In JSCs that are members of business groups in 
any particular status, roles of shareholder meetings and boards of directors is generally 
higher than in independent companies. When an enterprise presents a whole business, 
influence of its shareholder meeting is relatively higher than in ordinary members of 
holding company groups, but there is no significant difference in the role of the board 
of directors. 
Although direct assessments of the influence of shareholder meetings are identical 
under different organizational types of control, the role of a board of directors is found 
to be higher under separation of functions (Figure 2.5). Interestingly, three quarter of 
the respondents pointed at high influence of boards of directors in the sub-group of 
companies where the CEO is a shareholder. 
2.4.3. Composition of Boards of Directors 
Previous surveys showed that membership of the boards of directors were 7 persons on 
the average and tended to get smaller (Yasin (ed), 2004; Dolgopyatova, 2001). For 
instance,  in 2005 an average board had 6.7 members. In a typical board, company 
managers prevailed (they were likely to be shareholders as well), and representatives 
of  large  outside  shareholders  took  the  second  place.  Managers  and  large  outside 
shareholders  secured  78%  of  all  votes  in  boards  of  directors  (Table  2.5),  while 
independent directors together with minority shareholders got less than one ninth. 
Major  actors  of  corporate  governance  retain  extremely  high  level  of 
representation  irrespective  of  whether  their  companies  are  parts  of  a  business  (a 
holding  company  group)  or  a  business  entity.  Structures  of  boards  are  similar  in 
independent JSCs and parent companies, if only we forget about independent directors. 
However,  the  first  place  in  member  companies  of  holding  groups  is  taken  by 
representatives  of  outside  shareholders  while  in  independent  JSCs  their  managers 
prevail, taking together with rank and file workers more than 60% of total votes. In Chapter 2 
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member companies of holding groups, regardless of their status, the boards of directors 
are usually larger, and representatives of independent directors are more numerous.   
Table 2.6 demonstrates substantial differentiation in representation of managers, 
large outside shareholders and, to a lesser extent, rank and file workers under different 
models of control. When management and ownership are non-separated, all company 
workers have 60% of votes, but when they are separated, large outside shareholders 
alone have more than a half of the votes (together with independent directors, almost 
60%),  securing  themselves  the  opportunity  to  monitor  the  activities  of  executive 
managers. Under ‘complete  inseparability’, company managers alone  have captured 
two  thirds  of  the  votes.  At  the  same  time,  on  the  companies  whose  CEO  is  a 
shareholder  weight  of  managers  and  large  shareholders,  as  well  as  of  independent 
directors  is  found  to  be  the  closest  to  the  structure  of  the  boards  of  JSCs  whose 
ownership  and  management  are  separated.  In  this  sub-group,  the  share  of  votes 
belonging to all levels of public administration is also relatively higher. 
2.4.4. Renewal of Executive and Non-executive Directors 
Previous surveys seldom turned to analysing activities of boards of directors, which 
was  partly  due  to  difficult  choice  of  appropriate  indicators.  Records  of  in-depth 
interviews show (Dolgopyatova, 2004) that activities of boards are often a tribute paid 
to formal legal regulations and that their phoney nature tends to correlate both with 
fusion of the board with executive management and with stability of its membership. 
Indeed, less than a third of all JSCs in our sample have completely or to a large extent 
renewed the membership of their boards in 4 years. Intensity of renewal was much 
higher at ordinary member firms of holding company groups (Figure 2.6): a half of 
these member firms have substantially renewed their boards, against a quarter in the 
other joint stock companies. The most intensive renewal is observed under separation 
of ownership from management: it has been renewed completely or to a large extent at 
a half of all JSCs. The most conservative policies regarding boards of directors were 
kept under ‘complete inseparability’: in this group, total or substantial renewal was 
made at less than 18% of the companies. Chapter 2 
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Intensity of change of a CEO in a company serves as an illustration of the fact that 
separation helps better supervision of the management, because this changes happened 
under  this  model  of  control  more  frequently,  and  often  many  times  (Table  2.7). 
Obviously, a CEO could successfully ‘entrench’ himself in the cases when he was a 
large and a minority shareholder. Besides, in 2001-2004 change of a CEO was initiated 
by a company shareholders in 71% of companies with separation of ownership from 
management, and in a half as few other enterprises again. 
On the one hand, separation may have been an outcome of change of a CEO, 
which usually follows change of an owner. On the other hand, separation lowers the 
ability of a CEO to entrench himself, which is proved by a great number of cases of 
repeated changes within several years, and it also expands the field for hunting for new 
managers.  In  36%  of  companies  in  the  group  with  separation  of  ownership  from 
management, a new CEO was working at the same firm, but this was the situation at 
72% of the cases when the functions were not separated. 
2.4.5. Investment and Dividend Policies 
About three quarters of surveyed JSCs made capital investment in 2001-2004, and this 
proportion was the same under different relations between ownership and management. 
It can be suggested that, according to the ‘insiders’ dilemma’, separation of ownership 
from management will facilitate diversification of sources of funds for investment and 
decrease  reliance  on  internal  funds.  However,  specific  Russian  spirit  of  informal 
relationships can, on the contrary, make the creditors prefer to give funds to firms that 
have a real ‘master’ in person. 
We have established no difference either in access to different sources of funds 
for investment or in the scale of their use. Only a small sub-group of companies whose 
managers  were  large  shareholders  was  distinguished  by  relatively  more  frequent 
applications to following external sources. The funds in question came from a holding 
company to its member companies (used by 90% against 60-65% in other JSCs); or 
they  were  foreign  funds  (used  by  14%  against  3-6%  in  other  enterprises).  Let  us 
remind that this sub-group contains many parent companies and also has a relatively Chapter 2 
 68 
high participation of foreign shareholders in equity capital. 
Logically, dividend policy should correlate with attraction of investors, although 
it  can  have  other  grounds  such  as  need  to  maintain  good  relations  with  minority 
shareholders in order to avoid conflicts or to prevent them from selling their shares to 
other investors. In general, 37% of companies in the sample did pay dividends at least 
once, and a quarter did pay then regularly – thrice (Table 2.8). Indeed, listing on stock 
exchanges had its influence: more than two thirds of listed companies paid dividends at 
least once, and every second did it 3 times.  However, presence of  hired managers 
didn’t help paying dividends, and the most active dividend policy was found in the 
companies whose CEO was a shareholder (along with other managers as well). On the 
one  hand,  large  presence  of  minority  shareholders  was  certainly  typical  of  such 
companies, but on the other, inseparability can, indeed, give manager-shareholders an 
incentive for getting their compensation in this way, as an alternative to salaries in 
particular. Separation brings incentives for spending profits by other ways. 
Having excluded the listed companies, we saw no difference in the patterns of 
relations.  Let  us  notice  that  joint  stock  companies  whose  CEO  is  not  a  large 
shareholder show a stronger intention to have their securities listed on stock exchanges 
in the  near future (1 out of 8, against 1 out of 12 in other companies), which can 
influence their dividend policies in advance. 
 
2.5. Conclusion 
High level of concentration of equity capital is already established in Russian JSCs. 
Their great majority is under control of a single or a consolidated group of proprietors. 
High capital concentration is a universal feature of Russian business. The highest level 
of concentration is seen in ordinary member firms of holding company groups, where 
it is an instrument for keeping them inside the groups. The lowest concentration is 
typical of independent firms. 
The  outcome  of  redistribution  of  stock  ownership  is  appearance  of  a  large 
shareholder who, in the majority of cases, directly participates in management using Chapter 2 
 69 
formal labour contract. Although non-separation of ownership and management still 
prevails, the ongoing corporate integration works in favour of gradual separation. We 
found no confirmation for influence of enterprise size or specifics of its industry in the 
cases of formal separation of ownership from management. 
Inseparability of ownership and management works as an instrument for control 
in  addition  to  the  established  level  of  capital  concentration.  However,  in  case  of 
integration, intra-group stock ownership permits to turn this instrument down, to be 
replaced with either extremely  high  level of ownership concentration or with legal 
form of closed company as a member of a holding company group. When enterprises 
get  involved  in  corporate  integration,  this  implies  that  corporate  bodies  gain 
importance  and  that  in  member  firms  of  holding  company  groups,  executive  and 
non-executive  managers  get  separated,  in  contrast  to  joint  stock  companies  that 
represent a whole business. 
Hiring of top managers contributes to changes in the practice of formation and 
activities  of  the  board  of  directors.  Its  role  becomes  stronger;  it  evolves  into  an 
operative  agency  working  in  the  interests  of  large  shareholders,  and  it  is  able  to 
monitor  the  executive  management.  Companies  where  CEOs  are  small  or  medium 
shareholders  give  us  reason  to  expect  that  large  shareholders  will  gradually  gain 
stronger control over such companies as well, and that the pattern of work of their 
boards of directors will also change. This may be partly due to a growing percentage of 
companies in this sub-group that have their securities listed on stock exchanges or are 
going to have them listed in future. 
At  the  same  time,  separation  did  not  affect  capital  investment,  and  dividend 
policies, on the contrary, turned to be less active than under non-separation. Hiring of 
top managers did not affect the intensity of corporate conflicts and the style of relations 
with stakeholders. It has just lowered the barrier of defence for a CEO under a threat of 
dismissal. As we believe, such results tell that the insiders’ pattern of corporate control 
from the part of dominant owners remains unchanged and that the business is still 
‘closed’.  Shifts  in  corporate  governance  in  the  companies  where  management  is 
separated don’t go beyond internal mechanisms, but even this has introduced certain Chapter 2 
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good standards. All other factors being equal, these companies look more attractive to 
investors  if  dominant  owners  decide  to  share  control  with  them  in  exchange  for 
investment.  Transformation  of  executive  management  into  a  separate  function  and 
hiring of professional skilled managers, not necessarily from the inside but from open 
market, will also make the management better. However, these issues are beyond the 
boundaries of corporate governance, they belong to corporate management. Chapter 2 
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  Figure 2.1: Classification of joint stock companies by level of stock concentration 
 















Table 2.1: Average percent of ordinary shares owned by type of shareholder, % of 
charter capitala 














Federal administration  4.7  3.2  7.4  4.6  0.002/0.002 
Regional  and  local 
administration  1.9  2.1  1.4  3.0  0.516/0.476 
All  small  individual 
shareholders  24.9  31.9  13.8  13.7  0.000/0.000 
Banks    1.5  0.9  2.8  0.4  0.034/0.037 
Investment  funds  and 
companies  2.7  2.1  4.0  1.3  0.000/0.000 
Russian  non-financial 
enterprises  13.7  9.4  21.8  13.1  0.000/0.000 
All  large  individual 
shareholders  34.8  35.6  32.1  42.1  0.353/0.109 
Foreign investors  4.6  2.6  7.1  10.6  0.000/0.000 
Notes: 
a Here and further in the Tables, the sample means all surveyed joint stock companies minus the 
companies that had difficulty in answering or had no answer. For this reason, the number of JSCs in the 
sample is usually larger than sums by group. 
b The number of respondents fluctuates between 698 and 720. 
c The numerator is Kruscal Wallis test; the denominator is a test for comparison of medians. 








Table 2.2: Average percent of ordinary shares owned by type of shareholder at 
different levels of capital concentration, % of charter capital 
Type of shareholder  Low  Medium  High  Significance of differences 
a 
Federal administration  1.8  5.5  4.2  0.034/0.028 
Regional and local administration  1.0  1.7  2.3  0.136/0.138 
All small individual shareholders  30.5  31.1  20.5  0.000/0.000 
Banks    1.1  0.6  1.8  0.681/0.619 
Investment funds and companies  0.0  1.5  3.2  0.547/0.560 
Russian non-financial enterprises  6.1  9.4  16.0  0.002/0.002 
All large individual shareholders  39.5  35.4  35.8  0.107/0.064 
Foreign investors  1.9  3.0  5.3  0.207/0.193 
Note: 
a The numerator is Kruscal Wallis test; the denominator is a test for comparison of medians. 



























Figure 2.3: Classification of companies by participation of shareholders in their 
management 
 







Ɇ&Ⱦ_S Ɇ_S D_S Separation of ownership and management
 
Figure 2.4: Correlation between ownership and management in integrated and 
independent companies 





Table 2.3: Concentration of ownership and control in JSCs under different types of 
control, % of the number of respondents in each group 
Groups of joint stock companies:  Indicators of concentration of 
ownership and control  Inseparability  Ɇ&D_S  Ɇ_S  D_S  Separation 
Yes  81.6  86.2  84.7  72.8  80.9 
No  18.4  13.8  15.5  27.2  19.1 
Total  100  100  100  100  100 
An  owner  of  25%+1 
share is present 
Statistical significance of differences: 2 groups – 0.816, 4 sub-groups – 0.004
a 
Yes  68.6  68.4  81.7  64.1  78.4 
No  31.4  31.6  18.3  35.9  21.6 
Total  100  100  100  100  100 
An  owner  of  50%+1 
share is present 
Statistical significance of differences: 2 groups – 0.008, 4 sub-groups – 0.003
a 
Yes  31.9  32.4  31.9  30.8  27.4 
No  68.1  67.6  68.1  69.2  72.6 
Total  100  100  100  100  100 
An  owner  of  50%+1 
shares  is  present  along 
with an owner of 25%+1 
shares (‘counterweight’)  Statistical significance of differences: 2 groups – 0.314, 4 sub-groups – 0.777
a 
Yes  88.1  90.7  93.0  82.0  84.6 
No  11.9  9.3  7.0  18.0  15.4 
Total  100  100  100  100  100 
A  dominating 
(controlling)  owner  is 
present,  by  the 




2 test was performed. 
Source: Author’s estimates based on the survey data. Chapter 2 
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Table 2.4: Influence of corporate bodies on decision-making, % of the number of 
respondentsa 
Ranks of influence  Total sample  Independent 
companies 





Strong influence  66.3/49.7  63.1/45.8  70.3/57.2  77.5/45.0 
Moderate influence  26.8/32.0  27.5/33.3  23.5/29.0  17.5/37.5 
Practically no influence  6.9/18.3  7.4/20.9  6.2/13.8  5.0/17.5 
Number of joint stock companies  772/788  471/478  260/269  40/40 
Statistical significance of differences: board of directors 0.169; shareholder meeting 0.027
 b 
Notes: 
a In the numerator, assessments of the role of boards of directors; in the denominator, of the role 
of shareholder meetings. 
b Ȥ
2 test was performed. 
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Figure 2.5: Influence of board of directors on corporate decision-making under 







Table 2.5: Structure of board of directors, % of total membership 














Company managers    46.4  54.5  30.5  45.3  0.000/0.000 
Ordinary workers, trade union    5.0  6.3  2.7  4.0  0.001/0.001 
Public  administration  of  all 
levels   
5.0  5.1  4.2  8.7  0.259/0.175 
Large outside shareholders    32.0  24.0  48.4  28.9  0.000/0.000 
Minority outside shareholders    4.7  5.1  3.8  5.5  0.853/0.896 
Independent directors  6.2  4.1  10.0  7.7  0.000/0.000 
Other  0.7  1.0  0.4  0.0  0.672/0.675 
Total membership, persons    6.7  6.3  7.2  7.1  0.000/0.000 
Number of JSCs  736  460  237  38  - 
Note: 
a The numerator is Kruscal Wallis test; the denominator is a test for comparison of medians. 






Table 2.6: Structure of board of directors under different type of control, % of total 
membership 
Representatives in the board 




Company managers  54.4  67.0  53.6  33.6  26.3  0.000/0.000 
Ordinary workers, trade 
union 
5.5  5.3  8.6  4.8  3.5  0.020/0.007 
Federal administration  2.2  1.3  1.8  3.9  2.4  0.013/0.877 
Regional and/or local 
administration 
2.8  1.8  3.2  4.3  3.4  0.041/0.655 
Large outside shareholders  25.2  16.7  22.7  40.3  50.7  0.000/0.000 
Minority outside shareholders  4.5  3.4  4.9  6.3  3.8  0.067/0.663 
Independent directors  4.9  4.2  2.7  6.7  8.8  0.011/0.055 
Other  0.5  0.3  2.4  0.2  1.1  0.344/0.269 
Total membership, persons    6.6  6.2  6.7  7.3  6.7  0.000/0.119 
Number of JSCs  498  278  55  165  190  - 
Note:
 a Kruskal Wallis test: the numerator presents significance of differences between 4 sub-groups; the 
denominator presents significance of differences between 2 basic groups of JSCs. 
Source: Author’s estimates based on the survey data. 
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Table  2.7:  Intensity  of  change  of  a  CEO  in  2001-2004,  %  of  the  number  of 
respondents 
Indicators of a CEO’s turnover  Inseparability    M&D_S  Ɇ_S  D_S  Separation   
CEO was never changed    71.3  75.5  50.0  71.4  35.3 
CEO was changed once  23.6  21.1  33.3  24.6  35.8 
CEO was changed several times    5.1  3.4  16.7  4.0  28.9 
Total of the sample  100  100  100  100  100 
Number  of  joint  stock 
companies 
533  298  60  175  218 




2 test was performed. 
Source: Author’s estimates based on the survey data. 
 








Table 2.8: Regularity of common share dividend payments for 2001-2003 under 
different  configuration  of  ownership  and  management,  %  of  the  number  of 
respondents 
Indicators of dividend 
policy 
Inseparability  M&D_S  M_S  D_S  Separation  Total 
sample 
Never paid for these 
years 
58.0  57.0  76.3  53.5  75.0  63.4 
Paid once for 1 or 2 
years 
12.7  12.7  10.2  13.3  7.6  10.7 
Paid for all 3 years  29.3  30.2  13.6  33.1  17.5  25.9 
Total of the sample  100  100  100  100  100  100 
Number of JSCs  529  298  59  172  212  806 
Statistical significance of differences: 2 groups 0.000, 4 sub-groups 0.000 
a 
Note:
 a   Ȥ
2 test was performed. 
Source: Author’s estimates based on the survey data. 
 Chapter 3 
Impacts of Corporate Governance and Performance 
on Managerial Turnover in Russian Firms* 
 




Establishing an effective governance system to discipline top management to produce 
maximized  shareholder  wealth  is  very  important,  because  the  diffuse  ownership 
structure  in  public  companies  means  that  shareholders  must  delegate  the  daily 
management of a business to professional managers, and they do not always bend over 
backward to satisfy their principals. 
To  control  the  potential  agency  conflicts  between  shareholders  and  managers, 
several mechanisms of internal control reside in modern corporations.    In this regard, 
the corporate governance literature pays close attention to insider ownership, boards of 
directors,  and  dual  leadership  system  (i.e.,  a  separation  of  chief  executive  officer 
(CEO)  and  board  chairman  positions),  and  also  to  shareholders’  right  to  remove 
ineffective managers.    In many countries, including Russia and other post-Communist 
countries, corporate law provides that the contract relationship between a company and 
                                                         
*  This paper is an outcome from the Japan–Russia joint research project entitled “Corporate 
governance and integration processes in the Russian economy” launched by the Institute of 
Economic Research, Hitotsubashi  University  (Tokyo) and the Institute  for Industrial and 
Market Studies, State University – Higher School of Economics (Moscow).    Our research 
work was financially supported by the Japan Securities Scholarship Foundation (JSSF) and 
grants-in-aid for scientific research from the Ministry of Education and Science of Japan 
(No. 16530149; No. 17203019) in FY2005-2006. Chapter 3 
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its  management  officers  may  create  a  trust  that  enshrines  the  right  of  arbitrary 
dismissal of executives.    This right may be given to the general shareholders’ meeting 
and the board of directors, if such an authority is delegated to the latter by the former.   
This legislative ordination is intended to be a formal tool for governing corporations to 
allow necessary managerial renewals in favor of shareholders’ interests. 
From this point of view, an empirical test to examine the likelihood of managerial 
dismissal initiated by a shareholder(s) or through an entrusted board member(s) and the 
positive  link  between  poor  corporate  performance  and  managerial  turnover  is  of 
considerable significance to measure the viability of the aforesaid shareholders’ right, 
that is, the enforcement of the corporate law in a concerned state.    In the context of 
transition  economies,  this  kind  of  empirical  work  is  important  also  to  assess  the 
development  of  the  private  corporate  sector  in  a  country  under  “the  great 
transformation” (Kornai, 2006) and the degree of adaptation by its citizens to the new 
principles of life in a market economy. 
Although  empirical  results  are  mixed,  many  financial  economists  confirm  the 
statistically  significant  impacts  of  the  governance  mechanism  and  corporate 
performance  on  managerial  turnover  in  developed  countries.
1    As  we  will  discuss 
later,  empirical  evidence  does  exist  concerning  the  close  relationship  between 
ownership structure and managerial turnover in Russia.    With regard to the impact of 
corporate performance on dismissal of poor performing managers, however, there are 
only a handful of papers supporting the empirical relation between the two elements 
(Muravyev,  2001,  2003a,  2003b;  Kapelyushnikov  and  Demina,  2005).    As  many 
researchers of Russian economy point out, the nonsignificant or neutral association 
between  bad  performance  and  managerial  turnover  in  Russian  firms  is  due  to  the 
obstinate managerial entrenchment in the background of substantial insider ownership 
as  a  result  of  the  mass-privatization  policy,  weakly  functioning  internal  corporate 
organs  and  serious  informational  asymmetry  between  management  and  outside 
                                                         
1  See Coughlan and Schmidt (1985), Weisbach (1988), Martin and McConnell (1991), Kang 
and Shivdasani (1995), Denis et al. (1997), Goyal and Park (2002), Abe and Oguro (2004), 
Huson et al. (2004), and others. Chapter 3 
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shareholders (Iwasaki, 2007).    Although their arguments are convincing, taking the 
degree of economic transformation and the current social circumstances in Russia into 
consideration, we feel there is room for more detailed research on this topic. 
In  this  study,  we  deliberate  the  possible  impacts  of  governance  systems  and 
corporate  performance  on  managerial  turnover  using  a  unique  dataset  of  Russian 
corporations.    The  survey  underlying  this  article  is  a  Japan-Russia  large-scale 
questionnaire survey of joint-stock companies conducted in the summer of 2005.    It 
covers  822  manufacturing  and  communication  enterprises  located  in  64  of  the  89 
regions of the Russian Federation.    This chapter is based on the results of our joint 
survey
2. 
From a methodological perspective, this study is different from most previous 
work  in that  we  deal with  not only  CEO  dismissals, but  managerial turnover  in  a 
company as a whole, assuming that different types of shareholders may have distinct 
impacts on removal of poorly performing managers.
3    We find that nonpayment of 
dividends  is significantly  correlated with managerial turnover in our samples.    We 
also find that the presence of dominant shareholders and foreign investors is another 
important factor causing managerial dismissals in Russian corporations, but these two 
kinds of company owners reveal different effects in terms of turnover magnitude. 
The  remainder  of  this  chapter  is  organized  as  follows:    Section  3.2  reviews 
preceding  studies  of  managerial  turnover  in  Russian  firms.    Section  3.3  discusses 
testable  hypotheses  and  empirical  methodology.    Section  3.4  describes  the  data.   
Section 3.5 presents our empirical results on the determinants of managerial turnover.   
Section 3.6 concludes the chapter. 
 
                                                         
2  For more details, see Dolgopyatova and Iwasaki (2006). 
3  In this chapter, CEOs denote not only chief executive officers in the western terms, but also 
company presidents and general directors. Chapter 3 
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3.2. Managerial Turnover in Transition Russia: Literature Review 
Many studies have been devoted to the CEO turnover observed in developed countries 
because this phenomenon offers a unique dimension to corporate governance theory.   
Likewise, this theme is also a center of attention for those involved in the study of 
Russian  corporate  governance.    In fact, many  researchers and research  teams have 
conducted studies on CEO turnover from the viewpoint of the appointment date of the 
current president and the reason for the resignation of the predecessor in order to use 
the data in empirical studies. 
Although  abundant  information  on  managerial  turnover  in  Russia  is  available 
from these survey papers, most of them simply show the percentage of enterprises that 
experienced a CEO replacement during a given survey period but not changes in the 
turnover rate over time.    Therefore, we estimated the annual CEO turnover for each 
year  from  1993  to  2003  by  examining  the  relevant  data  available  in  14  papers.   
Figure 3.1 plots simple means as well as weighted means by sample size in individual 
surveys.    Dolgopyatova (2003) suggested that CEO turnover increased after the 1998 
financial crisis.    However, Figure 3.1 suggests that it is highly possible that such an 
upward  trend  started  earlier  than  that  event.    In  fact,  the  differences  between  the 
average turnover for 1996 and that for 1997 are statistically significant at the 1% level 
by the one-tail test (t = 3.55, p = 0.004), whereas the differences between 1997 and 
1998 are not significant (t = 0.474, p = 0.323).    Furthermore, a regression analysis of 
CEO turnover that was adapted from the reform years (setting 1993 to 1 as the starting 
point)  and  using  a  level-shift  dummy  (set  at  1  for  1997  onwards)  as  explanatory 
variable,  led  to  the  conclusion  that  there  was  a  statistically  significant  average 
divergence of 5.8% in CEO turnover between the two subperiods of 1993 to 1996 and 
1997 to 2003.
4 
                                                         
4  The OLS estimation result is as follows: 
Turnover = 7.64* -0.27Reformyear + 5.79*After1997, 
(8.00) (1.18)                    (4.69) 
N=56, R
2=0.480, Adj. R
2=0.461, F=24.484*.   
The t-values are in parentheses.    * denotes that the coefficient is significant at the 1% level. Chapter 3 
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As indicated in Figure 3.2, after the mass privatization of state-owned enterprises 
conducted in early 1990s, the year of 1997 became the first year when the average 
share of insider ownership fell below 50%.
5  In the same year, the average age of top 
managers was nearly as high as their retirement age, with the proportion of CEOs older 
than 60 topping 28%.    In addition, the average CEO tenure (7 to 8 years) and turnover 
frequency (10 to 11%) for Russian corporations over the past few  years have been 
almost the same  as  those  for  American  and  Japanese  companies.    In terms of the 
frequency of outside CEO succession (40 to 50%), Russian firms have kept their level 
10 to 20% higher than the average for corporations in developed countries (Weisbach, 
1988; Martin  and McConnell, 1991; Kang and  Shivdasani, 1995; Muravyev, 2001; 
Rachinsky, 2002; Muravyev, 2003a; Abe and Oguro, 2004; Yasin, 2004).    Therefore, 
the increasing upward trend of CEO turnover frequency shown in Figure 3.1 can be 
attributed to the accelerated development of flexibility of CEO appointment against the 
background of declining insider control and the aging of Soviet-generation managers 
(so-called “red executives”). 
Table 3.1 lists empirical studies scrutinizing the linkage between CEO turnover 
and corporate restructuring  in Russia.    All  studies, except the one by Linz (1996), 
highlight  the  critical  effects  of  ownership  structure  on  managerial  renewal.    They 
share the following four common perceptions.    First, outside ownership is positively 
and highly statistically correlated with CEO turnover frequency.    Second, in contrast, 
insider shareholding significantly hampers CEO changes as 40 to 50% of enterprises 
with dominant ownership by managers and worker collectives have a holdover CEO 
from the Soviet days, a much higher proportion compared with that in other types of 
                                                         
5  During mass-privatization period from August 1992 to June 1994, 67% of all state-owned 
enterprises  eligible  for  privatization  adopted  an  option  plan  in  which  management  and 
employees were allowed to acquire a maximum of 51% of a firm’s total stock at 70% of face 
value.    As a result, the vast majority of the privatized firms had been heavily controlled by 
insiders.    However,  in  the  second  half  of  1990s  the  shareholding  by  insiders  was 
remarkably decreased mainly due to massive selling own shares by rank and file workers 
(Iwasaki, 2007). Chapter 3 
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corporations (15 to 20%).    Third, substantial changes in ownership structure resulting 
from the replacement of the largest or dominant shareholders are highly likely to cause 
CEO turnover.    Fourth, the higher the investment share of a top shareholder and the 
ownership  concentration  rate  are,  the  more  frequently  CEO  turnover  occurs.
6   
Moreover, there are two other noteworthy points, first that the government does not 
necessarily  speak  for  the  current  management,  considering  that  state  ownership 
increases  CEO  turnover  as  well  (Kapelyushnikov,  2001;  Muravyev,  2001,  2003a).   
Second,  the  frequency  of  insider  CEO  succession  is  positively  correlated  with 
shareholding by insiders and the federal government, while the presence of outside 
investors  and  local  governments  enhances  the  possibility  of  outsider  succession 
(Muravyev, 2003b; Kapelyushnikov and Demina, 2005). 
Table 3.2 shows the results from vote-counting analysis of the impact of different 
types of owners and changes in ownership structure on CEO turnover based on the 12 
estimation  results  available  in  the  papers  listed  in  Table  3.1.
7    Here,  multiple 
estimation results were taken from one study only when regression modeling, analysis 
period and other conditions were substantially different from others in that study.    In 
cases in which more than one estimation result was available from one study regarding 
the  same  subject,  the  most  appropriate  was  selected  by  judging  the  coefficient  of 
determination  (R
2)  and  selection  of  control  variables  and  by  considering  the 
simultaneous equation bias, among other factors. 
This  table  confirms  the  reversed  relationship  between  insiders  and  outsiders 
regarding  the  direction  of  their  impact  on  CEO  turnover.    Except  for  the  state 
ownership, all types of outside owners had a positive impact on managerial turnover, if 
they  are  estimated  statistically  significant  at  the  5%  level  or  less.    Domestic 
individual shareholders and financial institutions enjoy a relatively high probability to 
                                                         
6  For instance, a survey covering 334 industrial firms revealed that, as of the end of 2001, the 
largest shareholders in  enterprises whose CEOs  were appointed in  or  after 1998 had  an 
average ownership of 45.1%, whereas those in enterprises whose CEOs had been in office 
for 10 years had an average ownership of 24.2% (Dolgopyatova, 2003). 
7  For details of vote-counting method, see Hunter and Schmidt (2004). Chapter 3 
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affect the renewal of company top officers in comparison with domestic nonfinancial 
corporate shareholders and  foreign  investors.    Changes  in ownership structure also 
exert positive effects on CEO turnover. 
Regarding  the  interrelation  between  managerial  turnover  and  corporate 
performance, eight studies shown in Table 3.1 examine the effects of the renewal of 
top-notch  managers  on  ex  post  corporate  performance  and  restructuring  activities.   
Four of  them evaluate  the  refreshment  of management as positive  (Barberis  et al., 
1996;  Klepach,  Kuznetsov  and  Kryuchkova,  1996;  Filatotchev,  Wright,  Buck  and 
Dyomina, 1999; Krueger, 2004), and the other four have a neutral or negative view of 
its influence (Rachinsky, 2001; Peng, Buck and Filatotchev, 2003; Dolgopyatova and 
Kuznetsov, 2004; Yasin, 2004), leaving room for further discussion. 
A more debatable aspect in this regard is the reverse angle of the relationship 
between these two elements, that is, to the role of corporate performance as a trigger of 
CEO  turnover.    The  majority  of  researchers  do  not  provide  clear  evidence  that 
corporate performance affects the  frequency of  managerial turnover.    Many papers 
have  suggested  an  extremely  limited  correlation  between  these  two  factors 
(Kapelyushnikov, 2001; Dolgopyatova and Kuznetsov, 2004) or denied a significant 
correspondence  (Goltsman,  2000;  Yasin,  2004).    An  exhaustive  event  study  by 
Rachinsky  (2002)  covering  110  listed  corporations  also  supports  these  mainstream 
views.    According to his study, only 19.5% of all 113 CEOs who left their post from 
1997  to  2001  resigned  to  take  responsibility  for  the  worsening  of  their  business 
results.
8    This percentage is much lower than that of CEOs who stepped down for 
nonmanagerial  reasons,  such  as  career  changes,  age-limit  retirements,  internal 
reassignments  resulting  from  organizational  changes  and  nonmanagerial  problems 
(51.3% in total), and even lower than that of those who resigned for other reasons, such 
as  managerial  intervention  by  local  governments,  social  conflicts  including  labor 
disputes,  legal  procedures  concerning  corporate  rehabilitation,  takeover  and  others 
                                                         
8  CEO  turnover  occurred  in  69  of  the  110  companies  surveyed.    Twenty  companies 
experienced the phenomenon twice, and 9 companies experienced it three or more times 
during the survey period (op. cit.). Chapter 3 
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(24.8% in total).    Judging from the above findings, Rachinsky (2002) states that it is 
difficult, even in listed companies, to drive out top management on the grounds of poor 
performance,  and  consequently,  CEO  changes  are  not  sensitive  to  corporate 
performance in Russia. 
In contrast, the remaining two studies, Muravyev (2003a) and Kapelyushnikov 
and Demina (2005) demonstrate that poor corporate performance is positively related 
to managerial turnover.    Using data obtained in the survey of 437 Russian enterprises, 
Muravyev (2003a) regressed CEO turnover in the period from January 1999 to May 
2000  on  industry-adjusted  labor  productivity  and  other  control  variables  including 
ownership  structure,  board  composition  and  company  size,  etc.,  and  found  a 
statistically  robust  relationship  between  past  performance  and  turnover  frequency.   
He concludes “the fact that bad managers (either incompetent or opportunistic) are 
punished  implies  that  the  widely  held  assumption  about  virtual  nonexistence  of 
corporate governance in Russia is not valid” (p.168). 
Kapelyushnikov  and  Demina  (2005)  is  the  most  recent  study  on  managerial 
turnover  in  Russia.    Using  the  results  of  a  longitudinal  questionnaire  survey  of 
industrial firms
9  carried out in 1997–2003, they performed PROBIT estimation of the 
CEO-turnover  model,  and  confirmed  that  on  average  the  possibility  of  CEO 
replacement in loss-making firms is 8.5% higher than that in profitable corporations.   
Moreover, Kapelyushnikov and Demina (2005) also examined the impact of corporate 
performance  on  new  CEO  appointment  and  substantiated  that  appointment  of 
incumbent workers to top management is less probable in underperformed enterprises 
than in profitable ones.    Indeed, according to their regression results, the possibility of 
succession by insiders to company presidents in loss-making firms is 68.8% lower on 
average  than  in  well-performing  firms.    Because  their  dataset  consists  of  many 
unlisted  firms  and  ex-state-owned  privatized  firms,  their  empirical  evidence  may 
                                                         
9  It  is  called  the  “Russian  Economic  Barometer”  survey  project  –  one  of  representative 
longitudinal  enterprise  surveys  in  Russia.    More  information  is  available  at: 
http://www.imemo.ru/barom/. Chapter 3 
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suggest that the positive link between poor performance and CEO renewal becomes 
usual governance practice in daily management life in contemporary Russia. 
Although  their  empirical  analyses  clearly  indicates  that  bad  corporate 
performance  enhances  CEO  turnover  in  Russian  firms,  Muravyev  (2003a)  and 
Kapelyushnikov  and  Demina  (2005)  are  still  in  the  minority.    In  the  following 
sections,  we  will  show  additional  evidence  supporting  the  empirical  relationship 
between corporate performance and managerial turnover, relying on a complete new 
dataset of Russian corporations. 
 
3.3. Hypothesis and Empirical Methodology 
As we discussed in the previous section, most prior studies on Russian companies do 
not  find a significant  impact of company performance on  CEO turnover.    We can 
think of various reasons for the absence of correlation between these two factors in 
Russia.    It is possible that previous literature simply did not have a sufficient number 
of observations of turnover  events.    Another possibility  is that the  CEO in Russia 
does not play the same role in other countries such as the United States.    In the US, 
the CEO is the bridge between the board of directors and management team, and is 
solely responsible for management outcomes.    That is, the CEO is very powerful.    In 
other  developed  countries  like  in  Japan,  CEOs  or  company  presidents  are  not  as 
powerful as American top managers are.    Rather, they are regarded only as one of the 
key members of management team.    In such a case, when company performance is 
poor, it does not have to be the CEO who should take the whole responsibility, but 
other management members are to be blamed.    Furthermore, in these countries it is 
highly  likely  that  the  management  team  in  a  company  should  take  collective 
responsibility  and  resign  as  a  group  when  the  company  produces  extremely  bad 
performance or there is a great scandal about its corporate affairs. 
Because of the 70-year-long history of the risk-averse way of life in the Soviet 
period and the Continental European nature of corporate law, the management system 
in Russian corporations, especially in the former socialist enterprises, inclines toward Chapter 3 
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the  team  leadership  and  the  collective  decision-making  practice  on  everyday 
management.    Indeed, Russian company presidents generally do not stand aloof from 
other  executives,  or  they  do  not  have  sole  responsibility  for  all  company  matters 
including poor performance.    In other words, Russian managers often share the fruits 
of collective achievements in corporate management, and at the same time, they jointly 
sustain damage from any failure as a team member.    Consequently, it is conceivable 
that not only the CEO, but also other high-ranking officers leave their company in 
response to bad corporate performance caused mainly by their mistakes.    It is also 
possible that the entire management team in a Russian company may resign together 
due to an irrecoverable loss in its shareholder wealth or company reputation. 
Furthermore,  it  may  be  optimal  for  outside  shareholders,  who  have  a  certain 
insight into management style in a company they own, to call for resignation not of its 
president but of another senior manager(s) depending on the seriousness of company 
problems.    It  can  be  justified,  when  outside  shareholders  expect  that  the  CEO 
dismissal  may  not  bring  positive  effects  on  ex  post  management  of  that  company 
enough to offset the loss of CEO’s firm-specific knowledge and experiences.    It is 
particularly true for dominant shareholders who can easily access inside information of 
management activities in their companies. 
If  the  above  discussions  would  be  very  much  nearer  the  mark  concerning 
company management  life  in current Russia, we had  better examine  the  impact  of 
corporate performance not on CEO turnover alone, but also on managerial turnover in 
a whole company.    Relying on this presumption, we attempt to investigate turnover of 
not only CEOs, but also other high-ranking managers who are in charge of finance, 
accounting,  planning,  marketing,  or  sales  management.    There  are  four  possible 
events to examine.    They are turnover of both CEO and senior managers (Type I), 
turnover of only CEO (Type II), turnover of only senior managers (Type III) and no 
turnover (Type IV).    It means that we now have four mutually exclusive outcomes. 
Let the value to the ith company of choosing turnover type j (j = 1,..,4), be  *
ij y , 
and  assume  *
ij y   depends  on  company  performance  (Performance),  corporate 
governance related  variables  such  as  ownership  structure  (CG)  and other  variables Chapter 3 
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Second, the questionnaires were filled in after interviews with company executives.   
Third, 822 companies located in 64 regions of the 89 constituent entities of the Russian 
Federation replied with valid answers to the survey.    The proportional distribution of 
these  companies  by  federal  region  is  very  close  to  that  of  the  actual  regional 
distribution of business organizations according to the official statistics (see Table 3.3).   
Finally, the sectoral composition of the surveyed firms is also well representing the 
actual distribution of medium and large-scale joint-stock companies by industry.
13 
Out of 822 observations, we dropped workers’ joint-stock companies (people’s 
enterprises) due to the specific nature of their internal control system stipulated by the 
special  law  on  these  legal  entities.
14    We  also  dropped  companies  that  refused  to 
answer  to  at  least  one  of  the  questions regarding managerial turnover,  relationship 
between shareholders and managers and company performances, which gives us 602 
observations. 
Our survey contains many items on turnover of not only CEO or board members, 
but  of  senior  managers.    One  of  the  drawbacks  of  the  survey  is  its  weakness  in 
accounting  information.    Most  surveyed  companies  are  not  listed.    Although  we 
asked questions on company performance such as profit, dividend and sales growth, 
such  variables  most  likely  contain  many  measurement  errors
15.    In  the  following 
empirical analyses, it is important to take it into account the characteristics of the data. 
                                                         
13 The detailed sectoral breakdown of the 822 companies is as follows: (1) fuel and energy (66 
firms  or  8.0%),  (2)  metallurgy  (36  firms  or  4.4  cent),  (3)  machine-building  and  metal 
working (255 firms or 31.0%), (4) chemical and petroleum (33 firms or 4.0%), (5) wood, 
paper, and paper products (63 firms or 7.7%), (6) light industry (51 firms or 6.2%), (7) food 
industry  (169  firms  or  20.6%),  (8)  construction  materials  (78  firms  or  9.5%),  and  (9) 
communications (71 firms or 8.6%). 
14 For more details on workers’ joint-stock company, see Iwasaki (2003). 
15 Another thing to be noticed is its response rate.    Because our survey was interview based, 
the response rate was not expected to be high.    The ratio is approximately one third.    That 
is, one of three company executives refused to participate in the survey (Dolgopyatova and 
Iwasaki, 2006, p. 8). Chapter 3 
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The variables we use in our empirical model (2) are as follows: 
y: The CEO turnover dummy takes unity if the CEO left the company between 
2001 and 2004 on the  initiative of shareholders, otherwise, the dummy takes zero.   
Turnover dummy of senior managers takes a value of 1 if the company reports that 
many  managers  who are  in charge  of  finance,  accounting planning,  marketing  and 
sales left the company between 2001 and 2004.    The turnover index is created from 
these two dummy variables, which gives us four mutually exclusive outcomes. 
Performance: As independent variables representing corporate performance, we 
utilize two different indices:    That is, first, a dividend payment dummy (DIVPAY) that 
takes  unity  when  dividends  on  common  stock  were  paid  between  2001  and 2004, 
otherwise zero, and second, a sales growth index (SALGRO) that captures the relative 
sales growth to the industrial average from 2000 to 2004.    The original variable is an 
index (1 for doubled or more sales growth during the period, 2 for 1.5 times less than 
doubled, 3 for less than 1.5 times, 4 for not changed and 5 for declined).    We take the 
industrial  averages  of  the  variable  and  subtract  the  mean  from  the  company  level 
variable. 
CG: As independent variables of governance mechanism, we adapt two ownership 
variables taking into account the findings of the prior studies on managerial turnover in 
Russia, as mentioned in Section 3.2.    They consist of first an index for ownership 
share by foreign investors (OWNFOR) that takes 0 for zero, 1 for 10% or less, 2 for 
10.1–25%, 3 for 25.1–50%, 4 for 50.1–75 and 5 for more than 75% and second, a 
dummy  for  existence  of  dominant  shareholders  (DOMSHA).    The  dominant 
shareholder is defined as the shareholder who owns more than 50% of common stock 
and has controlling interest.
16 
                                                         
16 Although,  the  survey  covers  current  board  composition,  it  did  not  ask  the  composition 
before  the  turnover  event.    Although  we  could  include  the  board  composition  in  our 
explanatory variables, we did not so because (1) turnover or top executives likely precede 
changes in board composition so that the endogeneity issue is serious, (2) in many cases, 
when we include information of the outside board member ratio, our likelihood functions 
fail to converge, and (3) for some cases in which we could obtain the maximum, the outside Chapter 3 
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X:  Furthermore,  we  introduce  the  next  three  variables  to  control  other  firm 
specificity.    Namely, (a) Natural logarithms of the number of employment as a proxy 
of company size (COMSIZ), (b) Open joint-stock company dummy (OPECOM),
17  and 
(c) Industrial dummies for nine classifications. 
Table 3.4 shows the descriptive statistics for all the 602 observations and those 
for each turnover type.    Among 602 companies, 68 firms (11.3%) report that they 
experienced turnover of both CEO and managers (Type I).    Combining Type I and II, 
about  27%  of  companies  went through turnover  of  CEO  initiated  by  shareholders.   
SALGRO is positive for no turnover case (Type IV), but positive for all other cases, 
which suggests companies that experienced any type of turnovers grew slower than 
other companies.    The mean of DIVPAY is 0.45 for Type IV and 0.28 for CEO sole 
turnover (Type II), which suggests companies whose CEO resigned recently did not 
pay dividends.    There tend to be more open joint-stock companies that experienced 
Type I turnover.    Companies with more foreign shareholders went through more Type 
I and Type II turnover than other types of turnover.    The most noticeable point of 
Table 3.4 is probably the role of dominant shareholders in turnover.    More then 90% 
of companies whose CEO and mangers resigned had a dominant shareholder, while 
less than 70% of the companies that did not experience any managerial turnover had a 
dominant shareholder.    On the whole, Table 3.4 suggests that a company that has a 
dominant  shareholder,  low  sales  growth  and  more  ownership  share  by  foreigners 
experienced Type I turnover.    A company without dividend payments went through 
Type II turnover.    Overall, these findings seem to be consistent with the hypothesis 
we discussed in the previous section. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                        
board member ratio is not statistically significant. 
17 There are two types of stock corporations in Russia – open and closed companies.    Stock of 
a closed company cannot be traded without permission of all other stockholders.    To be a 
closed  company,  several  criteria such  as  the  number  of  shareholders and  the  amount  of 
capital should be met.    For more details on this matter, see Iwasaki (2003). Chapter 3 
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with poor performance tends to experience CEO removal more if their ownership share 
by  foreign  investors  is  high  or  if  there  exists  a  dominant  shareholder.    A  serious 
problem  in  this  specification  is  statistically  weak  effects  of  performance  on  CEO 
turnover  in  Model  [L1]  and  [L5]  full  sample  estimation.    Largely,  our  LOGIT 
estimates in Table 3.5 confirm the main findings of preceding studies, which suggest 
the  weak  correlation  between  corporate  performance  on  CEO  turnover,  and  the 
significant impact of ownership structure on top management removal. 
Next, we look into the joint turnover of company presidents and senior managers 
in our samples.    Table 3.6 reports the regression results by the multinomial PROBIT 
maximum likelihood.    The base category for our MNP estimation is the firms with no 
turnover events (Type IV).    Models [M1] to [M8] use the same sample criteria and 
control  variables  as  Model [L1]  to  [L8], respectively.    This time,  we  can confirm 
negative significant impacts of performance on CEO turnover (Type II).    That is to 
say,  DIVPAY  has  negative  significant  effects  on  CEO  dismissal  under  all  the 
specifications.    Although SALGRO does not have statistically significant impacts on 
CEO removal, the sign is negative under all the specifications, which suggests that 
poor company performance in terms of sale growth induces turnover of top managers.   
The  MNP  estimation  results  contrast  with  previous  literature  and  our  LOGIT 
regression analysis reported in Table 3.5. 
We think that the difference occurs for two reasons.    The first is the  fact the 
multinomial PROBIT model is statistically more powerful than the standard LOGIT 
model.    Notice  that  although  the  DIVPAY  dummy  variable  in  Table  3.5  is 
insignificant,  the  sign  is  negative.    Utilizing  information  of  various  turnovers 
simultaneously, we can  increase the statistical powers to reject the null hypothesis.   
The  second  reason  is  the  importance  of  distinction  between  CEOs’  and  other 
high-ranking managers’ turnover.    As we discussed in Section 3.3, when company 
performance is poor, it does not have to be always the CEO who is responsible for it.   
It is likely that other senior manager(s) may resign instead of the company president 
especially if companies are running under a collective management system.    Although 
it is almost impossible to identify who should take the responsibility from the data, by Chapter 3 
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controlling for ownership structure and other company characteristics, we think we can 
get  information  on  how  companies  react differently to  realization of bad  company 
performances. 
Another  noteworthy  result  in  Table  3.6  is  that  the  shareholding  by  foreign 
investors (OWNFOR) has positive and significant effects on CEO sole turnover (Type 
II),  although  the  effects  on  other  turnovers  are  not  significant.    The  effects  of 
dominant shareholder dummy (DOMSHA) is significant in Type I turnover, that is, 
turnover of both CEO and senior managers, but not significant in CEO only turnover.   
As for Type III turnover – turnover of senior managers only, DOMSHA is positive and 
significant when the sample is limited to firms with no dividend payment and lower 
sales  growth  than  industrial  average  (Models  [M4]  and  [M8]).    We  interpret  this 
result as follows.    It is very difficult for foreign owners to monitor activities of the 
CEO and other company managers in Russian firms due to several reasons including 
weak disclosure requirements and managers’ hostile attitude to foreigners.    Therefore, 
when the outcome from company management is poor, foreign investors are unable to 
identify what is the main cause of this bad performance.    In such a case, the foreign 
shareholders  may  simply  call  for  the  CEO  to  take the responsibility  following the 
western practices. 
On the other hand, if the dominant shareholder, who is in many cases either a rich 
Russian  private  investor  or  a  nonfinancial  corporate  shareholder  including  holding 
companies and other business groups, exists in a company, such a shareholder has a 
strong incentive to monitor the activities of its company managers.    With intensive 
monitoring, it might be possible for him or her to identify who is really responsible for 
the  poor  outcome.    Hence,  the  dominant  shareholders  with  deep  insight  into 
management activities in companies they fund may  exert pressure on an  individual 
manager to resign for his/her bad performance possibly through their unofficial contact 
with the management.    It is also possible for them to call on the whole management 
team to leave their companies, when, for instance, bad corporate performance has it 
roots  in  the  ineffective  coordination  of  collective  decision  making  on  strategic 
management matters or in terrible opportunistic behavior as a team.    Comparing the Chapter 3 
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marginal effects of Model [M3] with that of [M1], the former coefficient of DOMSHA 
is greater than the latter.    Recall that Model [M3] uses the observations with lower 
sales growth.    That is, the dominant shareholders increase the turnover of both CEO 
and senior managers when the company performance measured by sales growth is poor.   
This is consistent with the view that the dominant shareholder is playing a disciplinary 
role for Russian companies. 
Turnover of a CEO or senior managers could take place when internal conflict 
occurs  between  outside  shareholders  and  management.    In  Russia,  company 
infighting is not an extraordinary case, rather an everyday incident.    In fact, 206 or 
25.1%  of  822  surveyed  firms  responded  that  they  experienced  a  harsh  internal 
conflict(s) at least once from 2001 to 2004.
19 
Apparently,  the  internal  conflict  is  not  a  random  event.    Poor  company 
performance, or ownership structure and other company characteristics could trigger 
the conflict.    There is a possibility that the statistical relationship between turnover 
and other variables is spurious and the conflict could explain the turnover.    To check 
this possibility, we perform additional multinomial PROBIT regressions by including 
an  internal  conflict  dummy  (INTCON),  in  which  the  value  of  1  is  assigned  to 
companies that experienced infighting between managers and shareholders in 2001–04, 
in independent variables. 
Table 3.7 shows the results.
20    First of all, we can observe that the log likelihood 
of Model [M9] is -620.49 in panel A of Table 3.7, which is much larger than that of 
Model [M1] (-640.85) in panel A of Table 3.6.    This implies that internal conflict 
itself has a large explanatory power for our turnover model.    Second, although it is 
not  significant  at  the  5%  level  in  Type  I  of  Model  [M9],  generally,  INTCON  has 
positive  significant  effects  on  various  turnovers.    Third,  there  are  not  remarkable 
differences in estimated coefficients of other variables such as DIVPAY, OWNFOR and 
DOMSHA between the MNP estimations with and without the internal conflict dummy 
                                                         
19 See page 52 in Dolgopyatova and Iwasaki (2006). 
20 Sample size becomes smaller in Table 3.7 because some companies refused to answer to the 
question about the occurrence of the internal conflict. Chapter 3 
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variable.    Since it is possible that the estimated coefficients of INTCON are biased 
due to the correlation between this variable and error terms, we should be careful to 
interpret the results.    However, it is safe to say that the relationships between turnover 
and company characteristics such as corporate performance and ownership structures 
observed  in  Table  3.4  are  not  spurious  due  to  the  effects  of  the  intracompany 
infighting. 
 
3.6. Concluding Remarks 
Although the corporate governance literature provides much empirical evidence of the 
significant association between corporate performance and CEO turnover in developed 
countries, the majority of research on Russian firms is quite negative in this respect.   
The little correlation between two factors may be due to not having a sufficient number 
of  observations  of  turnover  events.    It  is  also  possible  that  the  reason  of  the 
nonsignificant relation between bad performance and CEO turnover in the prior studies 
is that the authors implicitly assume that the Russian manner of managerial dismissal is 
very  similar  to  that  in  the  United  States,  disregarding  the  collective  nature  of  the 
management system in Russian firms, especially in the ex-socialist enterprises. 
Using a unique firm-level dataset obtained from our large-scale enterprise survey 
conducted  in  2005,  we  attempted  to  deal  with  the  above  two  problems.    The 
estimation results of the multinomial PROBIT model reported in the previous section 
strongly  suggest  that  nonpayment  of  dividends  as  a  proxy  of  bad  corporate 
performance is significantly correlated with managerial turnover in stark contrast to the 
standard  LOGIT  estimation  of  CEO  turnover  as  the  preceding  studies  do.    It  is 
possible  that  utilizing  information  of  various  turnovers  simultaneously,  we  can 
increase the statistical powers to reject the null hypothesis. 
We also find that the presence of a dominant shareholder or foreign investor is 
another  important  factor  in  causing  managerial  dismissal  in  Russian  corporations.   
This  finding  is  mostly  consistent  with  the  preceding  work.    However,  it  is  more 
important  to  point  out  from  the  analytical  viewpoint  that  these  two  kinds  of Chapter 3 
  102 
shareholders  may  have  different  effects  on  managerial  turnover  in  terms  of  its 
magnitude.    That  might  be  because  there  is  a  perceptible  difference  in  behavioral 
patterns between Russia and foreign investors.    The large shareholding may also play 
a  significant  role  to  inspire  dominant  shareholders  to conduct intensive  monitoring 
over management activities in companies they own.    Not simply removing company 
presidents  in  response  to  poor  management  outcomes,  dominant  shareholders  may 
utilize human capital in their companies more effectively than minority shareholders 
including foreign investors do. 
At any rate, the presence of the empirical relationship between dividend payment 
and managerial turnover indicates the growing respect to shareholder wealth in Russia 
among domestic investors.    As the transition to a market economy will go further, we 
may  see  more  visible  change  in empirical results  of  this  country  even  in  the  near 
future. Chapter 3 
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Figure 3.1: Changes in CEO turnover frequency, 1993-2003
Source: Authors' illustration based on Klepach, Kuznetsov, and Kryuchkova (1996) (covering 66 firms); Linz (1996) (1,714 firms);
Filatotchev, Wright, and Bleaney (1999) (314 firms); Filatotchev, Wright, Buck, and Dyomina (1999) (98 firms); Radygin and
Arkhipov (2000) (872 firms); Goltsman (2000) (217 firms); Kapelyushnikov (2001) (135 to 156 firms); Rachinsky (2001, 2002) (110
firms); Gurkov (2002) (530 firms); Muravyev (2003a) (413 firms); Dolgopyatova (2003) (523 firms); Dolgopyatova (2004) (20
firms); and Dolgopyatova and Kuznetsov (2004) (328 firms).
Figure 3.2: Changes in average ownership share by insiders, outside shareholders and
the state in industrial firms, 1994-2002
Source: Authors' illustration. The ownership share of each category of shareholders was calculated basing on the survey results
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Paper Analysis period Tested interrelations 
a Empirical method 
b
Barberis et al. (1996) 1992-1993 II RA (OLS, 2SLS)
*
Frydman, Pistor, and Rapaczynski (1996) 1994 I RA (LOG)
Klepach, Kuznetsov, and Kryuchkova (1996) 1995 II DS
Linz (1996) 1992-1995 I RA (PRO)
Filatotchev, Wright, and Bleaney (1999) 1992-1996 I DS
Filatotchev, Wright, Buck, and Dyomina (1999) 1995-1998 III DS, RA (LOG)
Basargin and Perevalov (2000) 1994-1999 I RA (PRO)
Goltsman (2000) 1999 I RA (PRO, TOB)
Bevan et al. (2001) 2000 I DS
Kapelyushnikov (2001) 2001 I DS
Muravyev (2001, 2003a) 1999-2000 I DS, RA (PRO)
Rachinsky (2001) 1997-2000 II RA (OLS)
Rachinsky (2002) 1997-2001 I DS, CS
Dolgopyatova (2003a) 2001 I DS
Peng, Buck, and Filatotchev (2003) 1995 II RA (PRO)
Wright et al. (2003) 1997 I DS
Dolgopyatova (2004c) 2003 I DS
Dolgopyatova and Kuznetsov (2004) 2001 III DS
Krueger (2004) 1994-1997, 1999 II RA (OLS)
Yasin (2004) 2003 III DS, PS
Kapelyushnikov and Demina (2005) 1995-2003 I DS, RA (PRO)
Source: Compiled by the authors.
Table 3.1:  Studies of managerial turnover in Russian firms
b Each code represents the following: CS: Case study; DS: Descriptive statistical analysis (t-test of differences in means, ANOVA, etc.);
RA: Regression analysis (OLS: Ordinary least squares; 2SLS: Two-stage least squares; PRO: Probit; LOG: Logit; TOB: Tobit; *:
Analysis dealing with selection bias for privatized enterprises); PS: Point systems for individual survey items.
Notes: 
a Each code represents the following: I: Ownership structure and/or corporate performance have an impact on managerial















Insiders 2 1 0 3 66.7 33.3 0.0 100.0
Workers 3 1 0 4 75.0 25.0 0.0 100.0
Outsiders 0 2 2 4 0.0 50.0 50.0 100.0
Domestic individuals 0 1 2 3 0.0 33.3 66.7 100.0
Domestic corporations 0 5 2 7 0.0 71.4 28.6 100.0
Financial institutions 0 2 3 5 0.0 40.0 60.0 100.0
Foreign investors 0 2 1 3 0.0 66.7 33.3 100.0
State 2 2 2 6 33.3 33.3 33.3 100.0
Changes in ownership structure 0 0 2 2 0.0 0.0 100.0 100.0
Source: Compiled by the authors based on the preceding studies listed in Table 3.1.














Table 3.2:  Results from vote-counting analysis of impact of different types of owners and
changes in ownership structure on CEO turnover
Type of owner
Number of samplesChapter 3
Number Share (%) Number Share (%)
Russian Federation 822 100.0 468,841 100.0
Central Federal District 265 32.2 165,453 35.3
North West Federal District 97 11.8 66,452 14.2
South Federal District 71 8.6 51,841 11.1
Privolzhsky (Volga) Federal District 197 24.0 69,767 14.9
Ural Federal District 83 10.1 36,413 7.8
Siberian Federal District 85 10.3 54,741 11.7
Far East Federal District 24 2.9 24,174 5.2
Source: Dolgopyatova and Iwasaki (2006, p.15).  Official statistics are quoted to the released data by the
Russian Statistical Service.
Table 3.3: Regional distribution of surveyed firms and comparison with
official statistics on that of business organizations
Official statistics
(as of January 1, 2004)
Enterprise survey
109Table 3.4: Descriptive statistics of independent variables by company group in terms of turnover type
All firms 602 (100.0) 0.392 (0.489) -0.029 (1.249) 0.364 (1.054) 0.728 (0.446) 6.464 (1.251) 0.688 (0.464)
Firms with turnover of CEO and senior
managers (Type I)
68 (11.3) 0.426 (0.498) -0.132 (1.234) 0.618 (1.350) 0.912 (0.286) 6.802 (1.506) 0.794 (0.407)
Firms with CEO turnover only (Type II) 75 (12.5) 0.280 (0.452) -0.051 (1.406) 0.693 (1.559) 0.760 (0.430) 6.614 (1.308) 0.667 (0.475)
Firms with turnover of senior managers only
(Type III)
107 (17.8) 0.318 (0.468) -0.149 (1.220) 0.336 (0.941) 0.738 (0.442) 6.393 (1.203) 0.729 (0.447)
Firm with no turnover (Type IV) 352 (58.5) 0.432 (0.496) 0.032 (1.226) 0.253 (0.852) 0.682 (0.466) 6.389 (1.190) 0.659 (0.475)
Source: Authors' calculation.




mean (S.D) mean (S.D) mean (S.D) number (%) mean (S.D) mean (S.D) mean (S.D)Chapter 3
A. Estimation with industrial effects
Coef. dF/dx Coef. dF/dx Coef. dF/dx Coef. dF/dx
COMSIZ 0.1635 0.0283 0.1364 0.0252 0.2266* 0.0404* 0.2600 0.0517
(1.86) (1.87) (1.12) (1.12) (2.07) (2.08) (1.67) (1.68)
OWNFOR 0.2594** 0.0449** 0.2621* 0.0484* 0.1926 0.0344 0.2017 0.0401
(2.95) (2.95) (2.42) (2.43) (1.79) (1.79) (1.56) (1.56)
DOMSHA 0.7696** 0.1205*** 0.3338 0.059 0.8494* 0.1352** 0.3369 0.0642
(3.05) (3.45) (1.11) (1.16) (2.45) (2.83) (0.82) (0.86)
OPECOM 0.1221 0.0209 -0.0222 -0.0041 -0.4026 -0.0747 -0.6106 -0.1269
(0.52) (0.53) (-0.08) (-0.08) (-1.32) (-1.28) (-1.70) (-1.65)
SALGRO -0.0033 -0.0006 -0.029 -0.0054
(-0.04) (-0.04) (-0.30) (-0.30)
DIVPAY -0.3933 -0.0665 -0.6143* -0.1054*
(-1.79) (-1.84) (-2.07) (-2.17)
Constant -2.7456*** -2.3804* -2.5268** -2.0095




B. Estimation without industrial effects
Coef. dF/dx Coef. dF/dx Coef. dF/dx Coef. dF/dx
COMSIZ 0.1714* 0.0299* 0.1417 0.0265 0.2525* 0.0459* 0.2982* 0.0600*
(2.06) (2.07) (1.24) (1.25) (2.42) (2.44) (2.09) (2.10)
OWNFOR 0.2443** 0.0427** 0.1970* 0.0369* 0.1888 0.0343 0.1554 0.0313
(2.92) (2.92) (2.00) (2.00) (1.86) (1.86) (1.33) (1.33)
DOMSHA 0.7597** 0.1202*** 0.3656 0.0653 0.8342* 0.1356** 0.3637 0.0699
(3.04) (3.45) (1.24) (1.31) (2.47) (2.84) (0.93) (0.98)
OPECOM 0.1247 0.0215 0.0134 0.0025 -0.3753 -0.0706 -0.5477 -0.1145
(0.55) (0.56) (0.05) (0.05) (-1.28) (-1.24) (-1.58) (-1.54)
SALGRO -0.0072 -0.0013 -0.0388 -0.0073
(-0.09) (-0.09) (-0.40) (-0.40)
DIVPAY -0.3458 -0.0591 -0.5599 -0.0981*
(-1.63) (-1.67) (-1.96) (-2.05)
Constant -2.9341*** -2.3375** -3.0387*** -2.8181**





b dF/dx denotes marginal effects of independent variables.



















a Model [L1] and [L5] are estimated using full sample; Model [L2] and [L6] - firms without dividend payment; Model [L3] and
[L7] - firms with lower sales growth than industrial average; Model [L4] and [L8] - firms without dividend payment and with lower sales
growth than industrial average.
Table 3.5: LOGIT regression analysis of the impacts of corporate governance and
performance on CEO turnover
602 366 337 208
[L7] [L8]
No No
-315.0965 -203.0402 -179.5852 -119.7881
 111Chapter 3
A. Estimation with industrial effects
Coef. dF/dx Coef. dF/dx Coef. dF/dx Coef. dF/dx
CONSIZ 0.1338 0.0145 0.1577 0.0043 0.2600* 0.0460* 0.3121* 0.0239*
(1.57) (1.35) (1.29) (1.08) (2.42) (2.43) (1.98) (1.97)
OWNFOR 0.2021* 0.0195 0.1399 0.0025 0.1132 0.0162 0.0523 0.0015
(2.26) (1.78) (1.12) (0.59) (0.97) (0.78) (0.32) (0.12)
DOMSHA 1.0467*** 0.1038*** 0.5959 0.0133 1.0405** 0.1529*** 0.6577 0.0401
(3.85) (4.71) (1.87) (1.66) (2.89) (3.60) (1.56) (1.72)
OPECOM 0.3457 0.0381 0.2900 0.0073 -0.0628 -0.0082 -0.1481 -0.0085
(1.47) (1.42) (0.99) (0.82) (-0.20) (-0.14) (-0.39) (-0.27)
SALGRO -0.0501 -0.0039 -0.0796 -0.002
(-0.64) (-0.39) (-0.82) (-0.60)
DIVPAY -0.1524 0.0061 -0.4162 -0.0611
(-0.73) (0.23) (-1.49) (-1.30)
Constant -3.0772*** -3.4906** -3.6890*** -3.4274**
(-4.23) (-3.20) (-3.87) (-2.58)
CONSIZ 0.125 0.0157 0.0878 0.0111 0.1127 0.0016 0.1245 0.0053
(1.50) (1.29) (0.75) (0.55) (1.02) (0.40) (0.80) (0.55)
OWNFOR 0.2135* 0.0255* 0.2472* 0.0419* 0.2298* 0.0073 0.2778* 0.0170*
(2.56) (2.18) (2.51) (2.49) (2.22) (1.92) (2.23) (2.13)
DOMSHA 0.3058 0.0169 0.2128 0.0107 0.4554 0.0069 0.3387 0.0142
(1.44) (0.58) (0.80) (0.23) (1.53) (0.75) (0.90) (0.72)
OPECOM -0.0121 -0.019 -0.0403 -0.0293 -0.4216 -0.0185 -0.4575 -0.0317
(-0.06) (-0.59) (-0.16) (-0.64) (-1.47) (-1.32) (-1.33) (-1.20)
SALGRO -0.0052 0.0038 -0.0174 0.002
(-0.07) (0.35) (-0.20) (0.13)
DIVPAY -0.6183** -0.0758** -0.7483** -0.0217*
(-2.95) (-2.73) (-2.61) (-2.25)
Constant -1.8564** -1.8015 -1.2989 -1.3034
(-2.79) (-1.96) (-1.50) (-1.09)
CONSIZ 0.0217 -0.0049 0.0731 0.0098 0.0649 -0.0005 0.0575 0.000
(0.27) (-0.32) (0.66) (0.43) (0.62) (-0.08) (0.39) (-0.00)
OWNFOR 0.0873 0.0028 0.0678 -0.0005 0.1494 0.0071 0.1633 0.0019
(0.98) (0.17) (0.63) (-0.02) (1.39) (1.09) (1.21) (0.97)
DOMSHA 0.2471 0.010 0.4635 0.0819 0.3400 0.0054 0.8916* 0.0084*
(1.28) (0.28) (1.79) (1.70) (1.28) (0.36) (2.29) (2.18)
OPECOM 0.2267 0.0351 0.3388 0.0734 0.0743 0.0074 0.3108 0.0053
(1.15) (0.99) (1.39) (1.54) (0.28) (0.48) (0.92) (1.33)
SALGRO -0.0864 -0.0158 -0.080 -0.0162
(-1.27) (-1.23) (-0.97) (-0.94)
DIVPAY -0.3824* -0.0488 -0.4404 -0.0186
(-2.05) (-1.45) (-1.76) (-1.29)
Constant -0.9618 -2.3899* -1.6255 -2.3675
(-1.52) (-2.56) (-1.84) (-1.85)
(continuing)
Table 3.6: Multinomial PROBIT regression analysis of the impacts of corporate governance and
performance on managerial turnover taking its magnitude into consideration




































































































































































B. Estimation without industrial effects
Coef. dF/dx Coef. dF/dx Coef. dF/dx Coef. dF/dx
CONSIZ 0.1367 0.0157 0.1817 0.0226 0.2653** 0.0353** 0.3724** 0.0534**
(1.71) (1.55) (1.61) (1.58) (2.67) (2.61) (2.58) (2.60)
OWNFOR 0.1769* 0.0164 0.0573 -0.0007 0.0977 0.0029 -0.0161 -0.0191
(2.08) (1.56) (0.51) (-0.05) (0.90) (0.20) (-0.11) (-0.89)
DOMSHA 1.0349*** 0.1050*** 0.6400* 0.0601 1.0354** 0.1086*** 0.7273 0.0611
(3.88) (4.80) (2.07) (1.90) (2.97) (3.48) (1.78) (1.26)
OPECOM 0.3617 0.0389 0.3474 0.0358 -0.026 0.0041
(1.60) (1.49) (1.26) (1.08) (-0.09) (0.10)
SALGRO -0.0548 -0.0045 -0.0793 -0.0075
(-0.71) (-0.45) (-0.84) (-0.61)
DIVPAY -0.1855 0.0009 -0.4471 -0.0302 -0.0601 -0.0072
(-0.93) (0.04) (-1.69) (-0.87) (-0.17) (-0.13)
Constant -3.2185*** -3.1155*** -3.5787*** -3.9315***
(-5.69) (-4.08) (-5.08) (-4.05)
CONSIZ 0.1249 0.0165 0.0625 0.0043 0.126 0.0118 0.127 0.0075
(1.57) (1.41) (0.57) (0.24) (1.21) (0.76) (0.88) (0.31)
OWNFOR 0.2165** 0.0273* 0.2268* 0.0368* 0.2439* 0.0316* 0.2755* 0.0448*
(2.71) (2.39) (2.47) (2.50) (2.51) (2.27) (2.44) (2.42)
DOMSHA 0.2959 0.0169 0.2482 0.0073 0.4315 0.0318 0.3974 0.009
(1.42) (0.58) (0.97) (0.17) (1.50) (0.81) (1.12) (0.15)
OPECOM 0.0038 -0.0191 -0.0270 -0.0323 -0.4069 -0.076 -0.4433 -0.1065
(0.02) (-0.60) (-0.11) (-0.77) (-1.51) (-1.63) (-1.37) (-1.69)
SALGRO -0.0106 0.0031 -0.0262 0.0015
(-0.15) (0.29) (-0.30) (0.10)
DIVPAY -0.5575** -0.0667* -0.6544* -0.0705
(-2.78) (-2.44) (-2.43) (-1.93)
Constant -2.0897*** -1.6522* -1.8712** -1.8507*
(-4.07) (-2.39) (-2.84) (-2.07)
CONSIZ 0.0042 -0.0088 0.0369 -0.0016 0.0335 -0.0084 0.0691 -0.0073
(0.06) (-0.61) (0.36) (-0.08) (0.35) (-0.44) (0.52) (-0.27)
OWNFOR 0.0794 0.0017 0.0604 0.000 0.1321 0.0144 0.1546 0.0216
(0.92) (0.11) (0.59) (0.00) (1.30) (0.74) (1.29) (0.90)
DOMSHA 0.2102 0.0028 0.4522 0.0633 0.3048 0.0147 0.9392* 0.1439*
(1.11) (0.08) (1.81) (1.39) (1.19) (0.30) (2.55) (2.53)
OPECOM 0.2717 0.0433 0.3561 0.0656 0.1132 0.0431 0.3465 0.1013
(1.42) (1.26) (1.53) (1.50) (0.44) (0.90) (1.07) (1.71)
SALGRO -0.0836 -0.0151 -0.0799 -0.0135
(-1.23) (-1.17) (-0.97) (-0.81)
DIVPAY -0.3925* -0.0522 -0.4978* -0.0622
(-2.20) (-1.60) (-2.08) (-1.39)
Constant -1.1865* -1.6296* -1.2460* -2.1666*
(-2.45) (-2.46) (-2.03) (-2.49)
Source: Authors' estimation. The base category for estimation is the firms with no turnover (Type IV).
b dF/dx denotes marginal effects of independent variables.
c t-values are in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote 5%, 1%, and 0.1% significance, respectively.
Notes: 
a Model [M1] and [M5] are estimated using full sample; Model [M2] and [M6] - firms without dividend payment; Model [M3] and
[M7] - firms with lower sales growth than industrial average; Model [M4] and [M8] - firms without dividend payment and with lower sales
growth than industrial average.



































































































































































A. Estimation with industrial effects
Coef. dF/dx Coef. dF/dx Coef. dF/dx Coef. dF/dx
CONSIZ 0.1215 0.0143 0.1344 0.0037 0.2553* 0.0450* 0.2821 0.015
(1.41) (1.31) (1.10) (0.99) (2.31) (2.33) (1.77) (1.75)
OWNFOR 0.1938* 0.019 0.1252 0.0021 0.0865 0.0119 0.006 -0.0007
(2.15) (1.70) (0.99) (0.55) (0.73) (0.57) (0.04) (-0.08)
DOMSHA 1.0020*** 0.1020*** 0.5356 0.0116 1.0525** 0.1536*** 0.6181 0.0267
(3.65) (4.48) (1.66) (1.53) (2.88) (3.59) (1.44) (1.62)
OPECOM 0.3205 0.0367 0.2890 0.0065 -0.083 -0.0116 -0.1296 -0.0054
(1.34) (1.32) (0.96) (0.78) (-0.25) (-0.20) (-0.32) (-0.24)
SALGRO -0.0608 -0.0046 -0.1005 -0.0023
(-0.77) (-0.45) (-1.02) (-0.73)
DIVPAY -0.2193 -0.0006 -0.5205 -0.0772
(-1.03) (-0.02) (-1.80) (-1.63)
INTCON 0.4005 0.0430 0.5371 0.0134 0.8579** 0.1616* 1.0816** 0.0849
-1.8800 -1.3900 -1.8600 -1.0900 -2.9400 -2.5100 -2.7600 -1.8700
Constant -2.9361*** -3.3167** -3.7354*** -3.3210*
(-3.98) (-3.02) (-3.83) (-2.48)
CONSIZ 0.0899 0.0105 0.0647 0.0087 0.1021 0.0012 0.1127 0.0032
(1.04) (0.87) (0.55) (0.43) (0.90) (0.31) (0.72) (0.54)
OWNFOR 0.1987* 0.0223 0.2091* 0.0351* 0.1956 0.0057 0.2273 0.0088
(2.31) (1.91) (2.05) (2.02) (1.82) (1.60) (1.72) (1.69)
DOMSHA 0.2489 0.0094 0.1226 -0.0025 0.4117 0.0049 0.2784 0.0076
(1.14) (0.32) (0.45) (-0.05) (1.35) (0.55) (0.72) (0.61)
OPECOM -0.008 -0.0151 0.0139 -0.0169 -0.3953 -0.0152 -0.4304 -0.0185
(-0.04) (-0.47) (0.05) (-0.36) (-1.31) (-1.15) (-1.18) (-1.03)
SALGRO -0.0229 0.0016 -0.0325 0.0004
(-0.31) (0.16) (-0.37) (0.02)
DIVPAY -0.7447*** -0.0881** -0.8779** -0.0228*
(-3.38) (-3.23) (-2.93) (-2.46)
INTCON 0.4425* 0.0572 0.4370 0.0597 0.5904 0.0118 0.4476 0.0121
-2.0900 -1.6800 -1.5800 -1.1000 -1.9600 -0.9300 -1.0700 -0.6000
Constant -1.5394* -1.6151 -1.2402 -1.2142
(-2.24) (-1.71) (-1.40) (-1.00)
CONSIZ 0.0091 -0.0057 0.0426 0.0047 0.0583 -0.0007 -0.0094 0.000
(0.11) (-0.37) (0.38) (0.20) (0.55) (-0.12) (-0.06) (-0.41)
OWNFOR 0.0889 0.0043 0.0596 0.0001 0.1375 0.0068 0.128 0.0004
(0.99) (0.25) (0.55) (0.01) (1.26) (1.06) (0.92) (0.79)
DOMSHA 0.2223 0.008 0.4007 0.0754 0.3498 0.006 0.8595* 0.002
(1.14) (0.23) (1.53) (1.51) (1.30) (0.40) (2.14) (1.92)
OPECOM 0.1707 0.0249 0.3066 0.0643 0.0184 0.0039 0.3163 0.0012
(0.86) (0.67) (1.23) (1.30) (0.07) (0.24) (0.88) (1.21)
SALGRO -0.0966 -0.0171 -0.098 -0.0195
(-1.41) (-1.30) (-1.17) (-1.11)
DIVPAY -0.3858* -0.0445 -0.4870 -0.0192
(-2.03) (-1.28) (-1.91) (-1.35)
INTCON 0.1119 -0.0094 0.3562 0.0493 0.5614* 0.0199 1.0681** 0.0061
-0.5600 (-0.25) -1.3600 -0.8400 -2.0600 -1.0100 -2.8500 -1.3100
Constant -0.7967 -2.1102* -1.605 -1.9969
































































































































































Table 3.7: Multinomial PROBIT regression analysis of the impacts of corporate governance,
corporate performance, and internal conflict on managerial turnover taking its magnitude into
consideration





B. Estimation without industrial effects
Coef. dF/dx Coef. dF/dx Coef. dF/dx Coef. dF/dx
CONSIZ 0.1274 0.0157 0.1600 0.0212 0.2626** 0.0349** 0.3479* 0.0524*
(1.58) (1.52) (1.41) (1.47) (2.58) (2.58) (2.37) (2.51)
OWNFOR 0.1697* 0.016 0.0428 -0.0014 0.0737 0.0008 -0.0619 -0.0233
(1.98) (1.50) (0.38) (-0.10) (0.67) (0.05) (-0.42) (-1.08)
DOMSHA 0.9932*** 0.1033*** 0.5766 0.056 1.0531** 0.1089*** 0.6843 0.0581
(3.69) (4.58) (1.85) (1.71) (2.98) (3.49) (1.64) (1.15)
OPECOM 0.3375 0.0372 0.3627 0.0371 -0.0433 0.0016 -0.0157 -0.0036
(1.46) (1.38) (1.28) (1.10) (-0.14) (0.04) (-0.04) (-0.06)
SALGRO -0.0622 -0.0048 -0.0957 -0.0091
(-0.80) (-0.48) (-1.00) (-0.73)
DIVPAY -0.2435 -0.0049 -0.5526* -0.0403
(-1.20) (-0.19) (-2.03) (-1.18)
INTCON 0.3685 0.0409 0.5686* 0.0626 0.8416** 0.0952* 1.0340** 0.1174
-1.7600 -1.3500 -2.0400 -1.4300 -2.9500 -1.9700 -2.7600 -1.7000
Constant -3.1842*** -3.0640*** -3.7258*** -3.9664***
(-5.52) (-3.99) (-5.11) (-4.02)
CONSIZ 0.0972 0.0122 0.0433 0.0028 0.1182 0.011 0.1137 0.0085
(1.18) (1.05) (0.39) (0.15) (1.11) (0.71) (0.78) (0.34)
OWNFOR 0.2066* 0.0248* 0.1958* 0.0319* 0.2144* 0.0274* 0.2294 0.0401*
(2.51) (2.19) (2.06) (2.11) (2.14) (1.96) (1.96) (2.09)
DOMSHA 0.2453 0.0101 0.1773 -0.0021 0.3973 0.0256 0.3483 0.002
(1.15) (0.34) (0.68) (-0.05) (1.36) (0.65) (0.97) (0.03)
OPECOM 0.0078 -0.0156 0.0229 -0.0221 -0.3844 -0.0683 -0.3857 -0.0988
(0.04) (-0.50) (0.09) (-0.52) (-1.36) (-1.44) (-1.15) (-1.50)
SALGRO -0.0267 0.001 -0.0355 0.001
(-0.36) (0.09) (-0.41) (0.07)
DIVPAY -0.6696** -0.0781** -0.7612** -0.0800*
(-3.20) (-2.93) (-2.73) (-2.20)
INTCON 0.3955 0.0519 0.3937 0.0379 0.6023* 0.0468 0.4851 -0.0088
-1.9000 -1.5500 -1.4600 -0.7900 -2.0800 -1.0000 -1.2500 (-0.14)
Constant -1.9780*** -1.5935* -1.9202** -1.8350*
(-3.72) (-2.29) (-2.84) (-2.02)
CONSIZ -0.0072 -0.0098 0.0094 -0.006 0.0226 -0.0102 0.0181 -0.018
(-0.09) (-0.66) (0.09) (-0.29) (0.23) (-0.52) (0.13) (-0.63)
OWNFOR 0.0786 0.0025 0.050 -0.0001 0.1154 0.0134 0.1116 0.0162
(0.91) (0.15) (0.49) (-0.01) (1.12) (0.67) (0.91) (0.66)
DOMSHA 0.1881 0.001 0.4046 0.0591 0.3159 0.0189 0.9066* 0.1421*
(0.99) (0.04) (1.60) (1.26) (1.22) (0.38) (2.41) (2.41)
OPECOM 0.2268 0.0353 0.3321 0.0581 0.0797 0.0359 0.3833 0.1043
(1.17) (0.99) (1.40) (1.29) (0.30) (0.71) (1.13) (1.70)
SALGRO -0.0917 -0.0161 -0.094 -0.0156
(-1.34) (-1.22) (-1.13) (-0.93)
DIVPAY -0.3939* -0.0481 -0.5402* -0.065
(-2.17) (-1.43) (-2.23) (-1.42)
INTCON 0.0812 -0.0131 0.3315 0.0305 0.5905* 0.0673 0.9755** 0.1546
-0.4200 (-0.35) -1.3000 -0.5700 -2.2300 -1.1900 -2.7700 -1.9000
Constant -1.0762* -1.4677* -1.2624* -2.0271*
(-2.19) (-2.20) (-2.02) (-2.28)
Source: Authors' estimation. The base category for estimation is the firms with no turnover (Tyoe IV).
b dF/dx denotes the marginal effects of the independent variables.
c t-values are in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote 5%, 1%, and 0.1% significance, respectively.
Notes: 
a Model [M9] and [M13] are estimated using full sample; Model [M10] and [M14] - firms without dividend payment; Model [M11]
and [M15] - firms with lower sales growth than industrial average; Model [M12] and [M16] - firms without dividend payment and with
lower sales growth than industrial average.
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